The Reason Why Ethiopia's First Filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) Violated the Equitable and Reasonable Utilization Principle and Two Lessons From the Mekong and Indus River Basins by Teklu, Daniel Teshome
i 
 
THE REASON WHY ETHIOPIA’S FIRST FILLING OF THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN 
RENAISSANCE DAM (GERD) VIOLATED THE EQUITABLE AND REASONABLE 





Daniel Teshome Teklu* 
 
 
Submitted to the Faculty of Robert H. McKinney School of Law 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree  
Master of Laws (LL.M.)  
in International & Comparative Law 
 












* Daniel Teshome Teklu, B.S., Aerospace Engineering, University of Cincinnati’12, J.D., Wayne State 














Daniel Teshome Teklu 















I dedicate this master’s thesis to my mother Aynalem Ashebir (Ayni) and my father Dr. 
Teshome Teklu (Ababi), both of whom vehemently disagree with my conclusions. From beginning 
to end, they never tired of pointing out that equitable and reasonable utilization is neither equitable 









I would like to thank my thesis advisor Professor Dr. Frank Emmert for taking time out of 
his busy schedule to supervise and direct my efforts in researching this thesis. His instruction on 
conducting legal research in a methodical and ordered way, a system he developed called Mind 
Mapping, though tedious at first was very helpful in the end. His encouragement of what was done 
well combined with his merciless criticism of what was not done so well made writing and 
rewriting this thesis over the course of two semesters both a pleasure and a pain, the former in 











This thesis addresses the legal issues around Ethiopia’s first filling of the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD). The construction of the dam on the Blue Nile river raises concerns 
among Egypt and Sudan, the other riparian states on the river. Ethiopia contributes all the waters 
of the Blue Nile river but had not benefited from the river, whereas Sudan and Egypt utilize the 
river for hydroelectric power generation, irrigation and consumption. Recently, Ethiopia built what 
is projected to be the largest hydroelectric dam on the African continent. Egypt and Sudan worry 
that the dam will give Ethiopia control over the waters of the Blue Nile. This thesis explores the 
development of international water law principles from the late nineteenth century to the present 
day. Those principles have gained acceptance by the Blue Nile riparian states and are incorporated 
into the most recent agreement they signed in 2015. One of the principles of international water 
law Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia agreed on is the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. 
This principle requires all riparian states to take into account the interests of the other riparian 
states. This thesis argues, Ethiopia violated the equitable and reasonable utilization principle 
during the first filling of the GERD because it failed to take into account the existing uses of the 
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Quietly flowed the Nile until one day Sudan noticed a significant drop in the water levels 
coming from its eastern neighbor Ethiopia. For days, the water did not return to a level that was 
normal for the season. On July 15, 2020, Sudan announced that the water levels of the Blue Nile 
river coming from Ethiopia had been reduced by 90 million cubic meters or 0.09 billion cubic 
meters (BCM) per day.1 Satellite images of the Ethiopian hydroelectric dam, also known as the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), released by the European Space Agency corroborate 
the Sudanese announcement. Images taken by the Sentinel-1 satellite between June 27 and July 
12, 2020, showed a steady increase in the amount of water behind the GERD.2 
On several occasions, Ethiopia had announced it would conduct the first filling of the dam 
in July 2020. July is a rainy month in the Ethiopian highlands. The filling of the completed portion 
of the dam’s reservoir, also called the first filling, allows work to continue on uncompleted portions 
of the dam while the completed reservoir is filled.3 On July 7, 2020, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed 
expressed his government’s determination to carry on with the first filling. In a statement to 
Ethiopian lawmakers, he said: “If Ethiopia doesn’t fill the dam, it means Ethiopia has agreed to 
demolish the dam.”4 
Fully aware of Ethiopia’s intentions, Egypt turned to the United Nations for help. On June 
19, 2020, Egypt requested the UN Security Council to intervene in its dispute with Ethiopia 
 
1 Reuters, Sudan says Nile water levels fall after Ethiopia starts giant dam, (Jul. 15, 2020, 11:52 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-dam-sudan/sudan-says-nile-water-levels-fall-after-ethiopia-starts-giant-
dam-idUSC6N2CH02H. 
2 Cara Anna, Satellite images show Ethiopia dam reservoir swelling, Associated Press, (Jul. 14, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/600710323bb9bb4427a3d3b9a3115bae. 
3 Damian Zane, Ethiopia’s River Nile dam: How it will be filled, BBC (Jul. 16, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53432948. 





regarding the latter’s plan to fill the GERD reservoir.5 The UN Security Council met ten days later 
to discuss Egypt’s request. The meeting was held virtually due to the coronavirus pandemic. The 
Security Council concluded its meeting by issuing a press release which stated that the differences 
between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan can be overcome and that the United Nations stands ready to 
support talks to settle remaining differences between the three countries.6 The Security Council’s 
press release also noted that “an agreement can be reached should all the parties show the necessary 
political will to compromise in line with the spirit of cooperation highlighted in the 2015 
Declaration of Principles.”7 In other words, the Security Council concluded its videoconference 
without giving much needed guidance to any of the parties. 
A UN Security Council videoconference was not at all necessary to state the obvious that 
political will is necessary for compromise. The issue that needed to be addressed was why the 
political will necessary for compromise was missing. All one must do is take at random three 
people who live by the Blue Nile river, preferably one from each country, and ask them why the 
political will necessary for compromise is not easy to find. They can articulate the issue better than 
the UN Security Council did. Makhluf Abu Kassem, an Egyptian farmer, told Aljazeera, “The dam 
means our death.”8 Manal Abdelnaay, a Sudanese farmer, told Reuters, “It is true the Renaissance 
dam will lower the Nile’s water levels and prevent flooding. However, it will impact farming, and 
 
5 Reuters, Egypt calls for UN intervention in talks on Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam, (Jul. 19, 2020, 5:39 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-ethiopia-dam/egypt-calls-for-un-intervention-in-talks-on-ethiopias-grand-
renaissance-dam-idUKL8N2DW5GU.    
6 Press Release, UN Security Council, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Agreement within Reach, Under-
Secretary-General Tells Security Council, as Trilateral Talks Proceed to Settle Remaining Differences, (Jun. 29, 
2020), https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14232.doc.htm. 
7 Id.   





the Wad Ramli area is one that lives off farming.”9 And Berihun Yihune, an Ethiopian living close 
to the source of the Blue Nile river at Lake Tana, told Xinhua, “Our history is highly tied to the 
river and its waters. Same as our forefathers did for centuries, we continue praising the river for 
its greatness in our songs, and condemn it for taking our resources away from us.”10 The three 
individuals make their respective country’s position clear: Egypt sees the GERD as an existential 
threat; Sudan sees it as partly beneficial for flood control and partly threatening; and Ethiopia sees 
the dam as a way to utilize resources it considers its own. 
Following Sudan’s announcement on July 15 that it had noticed a significant drop in the 
amount of water flowing from Ethiopia, and the absence of useful guidance from the UN Security 
Council, Egypt asked Ethiopia for urgent clarification on whether it has started filling the reservoir 
of the GERD.11 Ethiopia’s Water Minister Seleshi Bekele responded the same day by saying that 
the reservoir behind the dam was filling due to the heavy seasonal rains: “The inflow into the 
reservoir due to heavy rainfall and runoff exceeded the outflow and created natural pooling. This 
continues until overflow is triggered soon.”12 Whatever Seleshi Bekele’s statement means, he 
would not say whether Ethiopia had closed the dam gates. The following day, July 16, 2020, the 
Ethiopian government denied that it had started filling the reservoir of the GERD.13 
 
9 Zohra Bensemra, et al., Fears at Nile’s convergence in Sudan that new dam will sap river’s strength, (Jul. 9, 2020, 
6:27 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nile-convergence-widerimage/fears-at-niles-convergence-in-sudan-
that-new-dam-will-sap-rivers-strength-idUSKBN24A1EC. 
10 Xinhua, Ethiopians rejoice historic moment on disputed grand dam project, (Jul. 25, 2020, 6:44 PM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/25/c_139238424.htm. 
11 Reuters, Egypt seeks clarification on word of Ethiopia filling dam, (Jul. 15, 2020, 12:41 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopa-dam-egypt/egypt-seeks-clarification-on-word-of-ethiopia-filling-dam-
idUSKCN24G2I9. 
12 Reuters, Ethiopia dam reservoir filling as talks with Egypt, Sudan stall, Reuters (Jul. 15, 2020, 10:16 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL5N2EM4OB. 





Despite its determination not to be forthcoming about what it was doing upstream, Egypt 
and Sudan kept trying to talk to Ethiopia. They even agreed with Ethiopia on July 21 to hold talks 
which would be mediated by South Africa.14 The very next day, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister 
announced that the first filling of the GERD was achieved and that the water had overflown the 
dam.15 Only six days before, the Ethiopian government had denied that the first filling of the GERD 
was underway.16 Egypt and Sudan were not amused. They condemned what they called Ethiopia’s 
“unilateral filling” of the GERD.17 Between July 15 and 22, 2020, Ethiopia had impounded a total 
of 4.9 BCM of water from the Blue Nile river.18 
The Nile basin carries 84 BCM of water every year.19 Out of that 84 BCM, about 86% 
flows from the Blue Nile river.20 Rising from Ethiopia’s Lake Tana21, the Blue Nile meets its junior 
partner the White Nile flowing from Lake Victoria22, to form the Nile river in Khartoum, Sudan.23 
The Nile then flows north into Egypt and eventually enters the Mediterranean Sea.24 Extending 
6,695 kilometers from the Ruvyironza River in Burundi to the Mediterranean Sea, the Nile is 
considered to be the longest river in the world.25  
 
14 Reuters, Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan to hold more talks on Renaissance dam, (Jul. 21, 2020, 2:41 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL5N2ES6C9. 
15 Associated Press, Ethiopia’s leader hails 1st filling of massive, disputed dam, (Jul. 22, 2020, 7:37 AM), 
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ethiopias-leader-hails-1st-filling-of-massive-
disputed-dam/2020/07/22/b3bd4e1e-cc0f-11ea-99b0-8426e26d203b_story.html. 
16 See supra note 13.  
17 Reuters, Egypt and Sudan criticize Ethiopia at start of new Nile dam talks, (Jul. 27, 2020, 3:21 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN24S2H9. 
18 Kathryn Salam, The Blue Nile Is Dammed, Foreign Policy, (Jul. 24, 2020, 4:11 PM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/24/the-blue-nile-is-dammed/ 
19 Mahemud Eshtu Tekuya, Governing the Nile under Climatic Uncertainty: The Need for Climate-Proof Basin-
Wide Treaty, 59 NAT. Resources J. 321, 324 (2019). 
20 Abiy Chelkaba, The Influence of the UN Watercourses Convention on the Development of the Nile River Basin 
Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), 12 MIZAN L. REV. 165, 168 (2018).     
21 Tekuya, supra note 19, at 323-24. 
22 Chelkaba, supra note 20.  
23 Tekuya, supra note 21. 
24 Id.  




The eleven countries sharing the Nile are: Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan, and 
Egypt.26 However, to say these countries share the Nile does not mean they actually share the 
waters. It simply means they find themselves in the Nile basin. Egypt utilizes about 85% of the 
waters for irrigation.27 
The sheer number of riparian states on the Nile is already causing an international 
struggle.28 An arrangement where Egypt uses almost all the waters of the Nile while ten countries 
share the remaining waters, if at all, would not work for those ten countries. The population living 
in the Nile basin states in 2018 was estimated to be 400 million people.29 This number is growing 
at a rate of 3% a year and is projected to reach 859 million in 2025,30  making the Nile River basin 
one of the most densely populated areas on the planet.31 In 2016, Ethiopia contained the largest 
population in the Nile basin at over 99.4 million people; Egypt’s population was at 86.9 million 
people and Sudan’s at 35.4 million people.32 By 2050, Ethiopia is projected to have a population 
of 278 million people, Egypt 121.8 million and Sudan 77.1 million.33 
From the beginning, Ethiopia’s construction of the GERD on the Blue Nile portion of the 
Nile river has been causing bitter dispute with Egypt, and to a lesser extent with Sudan. It must be 
noted, Sudan has not opposed the Ethiopian project as vehemently as Egypt has. On April 2, 2011, 
Ethiopia started construction of the GERD.34 In 2012, about a year after Ethiopia started building 
 
26 Chris Richards, International Water Rights: A Tale of Two Rivers, 12 J. ANIMAL & NAT. Resource L. 1, 13 
(2016).           
27 Id., at 15. 
28 Richards, supra note 26.   
29 Chelkaba, supra note 20.  
30 Tekuya, supra note 19. 
31 Richards, supra note 26, at 21. 
32 Id., at 17.  
33 Id., at 16-17.  




the dam, Sudan changed its normal course of siding with Egypt on the Nile issue and aligned with 
Ethiopia to support the construction of the dam.35 It ended its more than half a century of alliance 
with Egypt and lent its political support for the GERD.36 Sudan’s changed position has to do with 
its pragmatic consideration: the loss of oil revenue after the secession of South Sudan made Sudan 
increasingly dependent on irrigation agriculture. Sudan sees an advantage in the GERD project 
which inevitably regulates the flow of the Blue Nile, a benefit it will enjoy at practically no cost.37 
Dam construction can be an expression of power over a watercourse.38 Historically, Egypt 
has dominated the use and control of the Nile.39 Ethiopia is now challenging Egyptian hydro-
hegemony and the status quo that has served Egypt so well.40 Not just Ethiopia – the biggest 
contributor of the Nile waters41, but some of the ten other basin states, due to their exploding 
populations and increasing water demands, are also challenging Egypt’s dominance.42 However, 
the biggest challenge to Egypt’s heretofore dominant position on the Nile is Ethiopia’s 
construction of the GERD. The project is the first ever real challenge to the status quo hitherto 
sustained by Egyptian hegemony.43 With a reservoir capable of swallowing the entire 74 BCM 
annual flow of the Blue Nile river, the GERD is projected to be the largest hydroelectric dam in 
Africa.44 When completed, it will generate 6,000 Megawatts of electricity45, about three times as 
 
35 Id.           
36 Dereje Zeleke Mekonnen, Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Some Issues of 
Concern, 11 MIZAN L. REV. 255, 269-71 (2017).               
37 Id., at 270.  
38 David Goad, Water Law Be Dammed?: How Dam Construction by Non-Hegemonic Basin States Places Strain on 
the Customary Law of Transboundary Watercourses, 35 AM. U. INT'l L. REV. 907, 909 (2020).   
39 Id., at 913.  
40 Id., at 930.  
41 Chelkaba, supra note 20.  
42 Goad, supra note 38, at 913.  
43 Mekonnen, supra note 36, at 266-67.  
44 Richards, supra note 26, at 15.  




much electricity as Egypt’s Aswan High Dam.46 The project’s magnitude threatens to undermine 
Egyptian hegemony on the Nile.47 
A bitter dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia was inevitable considering the dam’s 
symbolic meaning to Ethiopians who see it as a sign of national reawakening and Egyptian fears 
about losing what they consider to be their historic right to the Nile waters.48 The price tag for the 
GERD project is $4.2 billion.49 Ethiopia self-financed the entire amount.50 The project created 
12,000 jobs.51 This all sounds wonderful from the Ethiopian perspective, but from the Egyptian 
and Sudanese perspectives things look a bit different. Some consider Ethiopia’s construction of 
the GERD as a “significant counter-hegemonic measure”.52 However, Egypt has a lot more to lose 
than just hegemony. Egypt heavily depends on the Nile for its commercial and domestic water 
needs.53 Nearly the entire Egyptian population lives on a tiny strip of cultivatable land on the banks 
of the Nile river, which is no more than 5.5% of the total Egyptian territory.54 
The uncanny timing of the GERD project should not be ignored. Months before Ethiopia 
announced the construction of GERD in 2011, the Arab Spring protests were raging across the 
Middle East. The protests started when the 26-year old Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, 
angry at his mistreatment in the hands of a policewoman, doused himself with kerosene and lit 
 
46 Goad, supra note 38, at 913-14.  
47 Id., at 914  
48 Tamar Meshel, Swimming against the Current: Revisiting the Principles of International Water Law in the 
Resolution of Fresh Water Disputes, 61 Harv. Int'l L.J. 135, 138-39 (2020) [hereinafter Meshel, Swimming against 
the Current]. 
49 Edna Udobong, The Rising Conflict on the Nile Waters: Understanding Its Legal, Environmental, and Public 
Health Consequences, 10 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 467, 473 (2016).   
50 Mekonnen, supra note 36.  
51 Richards, supra note 26, at 15.  
52 Mekonnen, supra note 36, at 255.  
53 Goad, supra note 38, at 933.  




himself on fire.55 The Arab Spring protests reached the Egyptian capital on January 25, 2011.56 
During a national holiday commemorating the police, protesters flooded the streets of Cairo 
shouting slogans calling for the removal of President Hosni Mubarak.57 On February 11, 2011, 
unable to quell the growing anger of the protesters, President Mubarak resigned and handed over 
power to the Egyptian armed forces.58 Egyptian protesters would stay on the streets more or less 
continuously until July 2013.59 Ethiopia started building the GERD on April 2, 2011, during this 
chaos in Egypt.60 Despite Egyptian request to pause the construction, Ethiopia continued building 
its dam.61 Ethiopia would have its own democratic protests to deal with beginning in November 
2015, which would eventually lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn.62 
Despite protests and instability in many of its cities and regions,63 Ethiopia continued working on 
the dam. 
Egypt was intent on preventing the building of the Ethiopian dam.64 After realizing it could 
not stop the GERD from being built, Egypt found its way to the negotiating table.65 In 2015, after 
seven tripartite meetings, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan reached an agreement.66 This was the 2015 
 
55 Adeel Hassan, A Fruit Vendor whose Death Led to a Revolution, (Dec. 17, 2014), N.Y. Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/arab-spring-a-fruit-vendor-who-started-a-revolution.html. 
56 Aljazeera, Timeline: Egypt’s revolution, (Feb. 14, 2011), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 N.Y. Times, Timeline of Turmoil in Egypt from Mubarak and Morsi to Sisi, (Jun. 23, 2014), 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/07/02/world/middleeast/03egypt-timeline-
morsi.html#/#time259_7555. 
60 Richards, supra note 26, at 15. 
61 Id.         
62 Jina Moore, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Resigns Amid Political Turmoil, N.Y. Times, (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/world/africa/ethiopia-hailemariam-desalegn.html?auth=login-
email&login=email. 
63 Declan Walsh, et al., Ethiopia’s Leader Orders Military Action Against a Northern Region, N.Y. Times, (Nov. 4, 
2020, 9:39 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/world/africa/ethiopia-abiy-tigray.html. 
64 Mekonnen, supra note 36, at 268.  
65 Id.  




Declaration of Principles the UN Security Council mentioned in its press release.67 The agreement 
incorporates the basic international water law principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.68 
This agreement is significant because it is the only agreement between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan 
on the Nile issue which recognized the equality of the three states in their rights to utilize the Blue 
Nile river.69 
Ethiopia’s announcement of the GERD project at the height of the Arab Spring protests 
was opportunistic to say the least. However, this opportunism is not surprising at all. Over the 
centuries, the conniving neighbors that they are, Egypt and Ethiopia seem to have perfected the art 
of catching the other with his trousers down. Because of political mistrust, among many reasons, 
states sharing freshwater resources often behave in a self-interested manner and show mere 
coexistence as opposed to cooperation.70 The obvious fact is: “[the] Nile river basin is defined by 
the unilateralism of its riparian states and their incompatible claims which negate the fundamentals 
of international water law.”71 This is, as some call it, the “tinder-box politics characteristic of 
interstate freshwater disputes”.72 
The Ethiopian government would justify its opportunism merely by pointing to the fact 
that, before building the dam, despite contributing 86% of the waters of the Nile73, Ethiopia did 
not utilize any of its waters, whereas Egypt utilized 85% of the Nile for irrigation.74 After the first 
filling of the GERD, Ethiopia impounded about 4.9 BCM75 out of the annual flow of 84 BCM76, 
 
67 See supra note 7.  
68 Goad, supra note 38, at 915.   
69 Id.  
70 Meshel, Swimming against the Current, supra note 48, at 136-37. 
71 Mekonnen, supra note 36, at 255.  
72 Meshel, Swimming against the Current, supra note 48, at 138. 
73 Chelkaba, supra note 20. 
74 Richards, supra note 26, at 15. 
75 See supra note 18.  




which comes to about 5.8% utilization. Even so, however justified Ethiopia may think its building 
of the GERD is, Egypt does not see the dam as justified. Besides the fact that Egypt sees the GERD 
project as “an affront to their national security”77, the disparity in the amount of rainfall Egypt and 
Ethiopia receive is another reason why Egypt cannot see the project favorably. The mean annual 
rainfall in the Ethiopian highlands reaches 1,700 mm; in Egypt it is 25 mm.78 That means Ethiopia 
receives about 68 times more rainfall per year than Egypt. 
It is true, the GERD is a hydroelectric dam, which means its use is non-consumptive and 
does not involve reduction of water flow.79 It even has some benefits for Sudan because the 
reservoir will cut down on flooding.80 Some of the other benefits of the GERD include water 
storage in the Ethiopian highlands which has a low evaporation rate, compared to Egypt and 
Sudan,81 which would make more water available to all three states. But also true is the fact that, 
until the dam is filled, there will be a reduction of water flow. Ethiopia has announced its plans to 
impound more and more water in the next five to seven years to fill the GERD to its maximum 
capacity of 74 BCM. It has announced it will impound a further 13.5 BCM of water during the 
July 2021 rainy season.82 
This thesis focuses on the time period between July 15, 2020, when Sudan announced a 
significant drop in water levels of the Blue Nile river flowing from Ethiopia,83 and July 22, 2020, 
when Ethiopia announced that the first filling of the GERD was achieved.84  
 
77 Richards, supra note 26, at 15.  
78 Tekuya, supra note 19, at 325.  
79 Mekonnen, supra note 36, at 274. 
80 Richards, supra note 26, at 15.  
81 Id., at 23.  
82 See supra note 3.  
83 See supra note 1. 




Part I discusses the development of international water law. This part provides an overview 
of the evolution of international water law with respect to non-navigable uses of international or 
transboundary rivers. It shows how the Harmon Doctrine, arguably the earliest principle to govern 
non-navigable uses, was eventually replaced by the equitable and reasonable utilization principle. 
Part II discusses the legal regime in the Blue Nile basin. It discusses the bilateral and 
multilateral agreements made by various states regarding water use in the basin. 
Part III address the issue whether Ethiopia’s first filling of the GERD between July 15 and 
22, 2020, violated the equitable and reasonable utilization principle. This part concludes that 
Ethiopia, by not taking into account the existing uses of the Blue Nile river, violated the equitable 
and reasonable utilization principle. 
Part IV discusses whether Ethiopia’s violation of the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle is an internationally wrongful act. This part examines Ethiopia’s violation through the 
prism of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). This part shows Ethiopia’s violation of the equitable 
and reasonable utilization principle is an internationally wrongful act. 
Part V shows Egypt and Sudan are entitled to full reparations from Ethiopia for its 
internationally wrongful act. This part looks at the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) to address the issue of reparations and ultimately concludes that the ICJ does not have 
jurisdiction and that the dispute must be resolved by political means. 
Part VI draws two important lessons from the Mekong and Indus river basins. In the 
Mekong case, this part shows the futility of a water treaty made among lower riparian states which 




when the interests of both upper and lower riparian states are accounted for in a water treaty, there 
may still be dispute for the simple reason that available water resources are decreasing.  
Part VII attempts to address some possible arguments against the main conclusions of this 
thesis.  
I. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW 
There once lived a man named Judson Harmon. He was the attorney general of the United 
States. In 1895, the U.S. State Department asked Harmon to write a legal opinion articulating the 
federal government’s view on a water dispute with Mexico. The dispute involved Mexico’s 
complaint that the U.S. was diverting the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers.85 Harmon wrote: “[A] 
country is absolutely sovereign over the portion of an international watercourse within its borders. 
Thus, that country would be free to divert all of the water from an international watercourse, 
leaving none for downstream states.”86 The U.S. would later repudiate this principle by signing 
the 1944 treaty with Mexico which provided for the sharing of the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers 
between the two countries.87 
Harmon’s Doctrine that an upstream country can divert all the waters of an international 
river is what is called the absolute territorial sovereignty principle. This principle holds that a state 
has an unmitigated control over an international river within its border.88 A state holding fast to 
this doctrine does not acknowledge the international status of the portion of a river flowing through 
its territory. This is often the preferred theory of upstream states.89 
 
85 See generally Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised, 36 
Nat. Resources J. 549 (1996).                        
86 Id. 
87 Id., at 584.   
88 Goad, supra note 38, at 916.  




Although Judson Harmon was fortunate enough to have lent his name to the principle of 
absolute territorial sovereignty, Hugo Grotius had taken the same position as far back as 1625. 
Grotius propounded the notion of absolute territorial sovereignty over natural resources, stating 
that a river is the property of the people through whose territory it flows, or the ruler under whose 
sway those people are. This notion has lost significance today.90 This is obvious for the fact that a 
nation’s sovereignty over its natural resources is not unlimited91. Grotius’s view and the Harmon 
doctrine are now “archaic positions and are not considered a part of contemporary international 
law.”92  
The principle that is much preferred by downstream states is what is called the absolute 
territorial integrity principle. This principle holds that a state has a right to a natural flow of a river 
and that an upstream state may not impede or change that flow.93 This doctrine which guarantees 
a lower riparian state the continuous natural flow of a river from an upper riparian state has also 
fallen out of favor.94 
The history of international water law vacillated between these two incompatible 
principles.95 The absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity doctrines were 
not aligned with the principles of equity and justice.96 Since the mid-nineteenth century, states 
increasingly accepted some restrictions on the absolute territorial sovereignty principle, especially 
 
90 See generally Anasuya Syam & Sushma Sosha Philip, Investigating Interlinking: A Critique of India's National 
River Linking Plan, 5 ENVTL. L. & PRAC. REV. 1, 10 (2016-2017). 
91 Anatole Boute, The Water-Energy-Climate Nexus under International Law; A Central Asian Perspective, 5 
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 371, 400 (2016).    
92 Syam, supra note 90, at 11.  
93 Bode, supra note 89. 
94 Syam, supra note 90, at 11.  
95 Bode, supra note 89. 
96 Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, Equitable Apportionment of Shared Transboundary River Waters: A Case Study of 





the restriction on harm done to other states by one state without the other state’s prior consent.97 
This is, of course, excepting the American position in the late nineteenth century as set out in 
Harmon’s legal opinion.98 
Present-day international water law threads a middle course between the two extremes of 
absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity.99 It is now the accepted custom 
that states cannot use water unilaterally to the detriment of other riparian states’ equitable rights to 
the same.100 
International water law is now largely based on the limited territorial sovereignty theory.101 
The limited territorial sovereignty theory lies midway between the two extremes of absolute 
territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity.102 It balances a state’s right to use rivers 
flowing through its sovereign territory against its obligations not to cause significant harm to other 
states.103 Limited territorial sovereignty serves as a mutual limitation of sovereign rights.104 
Limited territorial sovereignty has two core principles which are generally viewed as having 
customary law status, namely the equitable and reasonable utilization principle and the no 
significant harm principle.105 
Equitable and reasonable utilization is the foundational principle of modern international 
water law.106 Underlying the principle is the assumption that “all countries are sovereign nations 
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that rest on equal footing in relation to one another.”107 However, sovereign equality does not mean 
each state has a right to an equal amount of water nor an equal amount of benefits from the water.108 
The equitable and reasonable utilization principle allows for limited sovereignty whereby each 
riparian state has the right to use the resource and the duty to manage the same in a way that avoids 
interference with the uses of other states.109 
The other core principle of limited territorial sovereignty is the no significant harm 
principle. This principle is rooted in the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laeda, which 
prohibits states from using their territory in a way that causes harm to another state.110 That is, a 
state may not claim to use the waters flowing through its territory in such a way as to cause material 
injury to the interests of another state, or to oppose their use by another state unless such use causes 
material injury to itself.111 The no significant harm principle is also a principle of good 
neighborliness.112 This principle requires a state to ensure that its use causing significant harm is 
equitable and reasonable.113 The no significant harm principle is not an absolute prohibition on the 
causing of harm to other riparian states. In fact, the principle allows the causing of factual harm if 
such harm is equitable under the circumstances.114 The prevailing view among scholars is that the 
no significant harm principle is subordinated to the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle.115 
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It took the greater part of half a century for international water law to evolve from the 
Harmon Doctrine to the equitable and reasonable utilization principle. Soon after Judson Harmon 
issued his opinion, states realized cooperation was better than the absolute sovereignty approach 
to resolve freshwater disputes.116  
First mention of cooperation on water issues appeared in the Institute of International Law’s 
(IIL) 1911 Madrid Declaration117. The declaration recognized the mutual consent of riparian states 
as a basis for watercourse use.118 In its statement of reasons, the declaration acknowledged the 
interdependence of states sharing a watercourse: “Riparian States with a common stream are in a 
position of permanent physical dependence on each other which precludes the idea of the complete 
autonomy of each State in the section of the natural watercourse under its sovereignty.”119 Among 
the rules the Madrid Declaration set out, article II(3) is notable for its specificity. It provides: 
“When a stream traverses successively the territories of two or more States, [n]o establishment 
(especially factories utilizing hydraulic power) may take so much water that the constitution, 
otherwise called the utilizable or essential character of the stream shall, when it reaches the 
territory downstream, be seriously modified.”120 Article II(3) limited the amount of water an 
upstream state may withdraw from the common stream to that amount which would not seriously 
modify the stream’s utilizable or essential character when it reaches the downstream states. The 
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declaration extended this principle to “cases where streams flow from a lake situated in one State, 
through the territory of another State, or the territories of other States.”121 
Following the First World War, international organizations started prioritizing multilateral 
water sharing treaties for non-navigational uses over navigational ones. In 1923, several European 
and Latin American states came together to sign the Hydraulic Power Convention.122 The 
convention outlined the water rights of co-riparian states, and obliged signatory states to assess the 
interests of co-riparian states when devising water usage components.123 It also established rules 
intended to promote “international agreement for the purpose of facilitating the exploitation and 
increasing the yield of hydraulic power.”124 Article 1 acknowledged a state’s right to develop the 
water resources within its territory: “The present Convention in no way affects the right belonging 
to each State, within the limits of international law, to carry out on its own territory any operations 
for the development of hydraulic power which it may consider desirable.”125 Article 4 imposed on 
states the obligation of negotiation: “If a Contracting State desires to carry out operations for the 
development of hydraulic power which might cause serious prejudice to any other Contracting 
State, the States concerned shall enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of agreements 
which will allow such operations to be executed.”126 The sort of agreements contemplated by 
article 4 include those which would provide for the regulation of water flow.127 
The differences between the rights and obligations set out in the 1911 Madrid Declaration 
and the 1923 Hydraulic Power Convention are obvious: First, the 1923 convention recognized a 
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state’s right, within the limits of international law, to develop the water resources within its own 
territory,128 a right the 1911 Madrid Declaration did not explicitly recognize.129 In fact, the Madrid 
Declaration went as far as to say that the permanent physical dependence of riparian states 
“precludes the idea of complete autonomy of each state in the section of the natural watercourse 
under its sovereignty.”130 Second, the 1923 convention imposed on states which desire to develop 
hydraulic power which might cause serious prejudice to other states, the obligation to negotiate 
with those states and reach an agreement concerning the regulation of water flow.131 There was no 
such obligation under the 1911 Madrid Declaration.132 
The IIL’s 1961 Salzburg Resolution133 reiterated the 1923 Hydraulic Power Convention’s 
position on a state’s right, within the limits of international law, to develop the water resources 
within its territory. Article II provided: 
Every State has the right to make use of the waters flowing across or bordering its 
territory subject to the limitations imposed by international law and in particular 
those which result from the following legal dispositions. That right is limited by 
the right of use by other States concerned with the same river or watershed.134 
Article III introduced the principle of equity: “If the various States disagree upon the extent 
of their rights of use, the disagreement shall be settled on the basis of equity, taking into 
consideration the respective needs of the States, as well as any other circumstances relevant to any 
particular case.”135  
The glaring difference between the 1961 Salzburg Resolution on one hand, and the 1911 
Madrid Declaration and the 1923 Hydraulic Power Convention on the other, is that the Salzburg 
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Resolution practically gives downstream states veto power on projects in upstream states. 
According to article VI, if objections were raised against such projects, “the State shall enter in 
negotiations in view of reaching an agreement within a reasonable time.”136 The obligation to enter 
into negotiations was reinforced by article VII which states: “During the negotiations, every State 
should, according to the principle of good faith, refrain from proceeding with the works or uses in 
dispute, or from taking any other measures likely to aggravate the conflict or to make a settlement 
more difficult.”137 
From the 1911 Madrid Declaration, through the 1923 Hydraulic Power Convention, to the 
1961 Salzburg Resolution, two interrelated principles emerged. The first principle to emerge was 
that within the limits of international law each state had the right to develop the water resources 
within its territory. The second principle to emerge was that each state had some responsibility to 
desist from harming its downstream neighbors. The notion embodied by the Harmon Doctrine 
seems all but forgotten by the time of the Salzburg Resolution. 
In 1966, the International Law Association (ILA) drafted the Helsinki Rules.138 The 
Helsinki Rules provided the traditional exposition of the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle.139 The rules combined a state’s right to develop the water resources in its territory with 
its responsibility to desist from harming its downstream neighbors and codified them as the 
equitable and reasonable utilization principle: “Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to 
a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage 
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basin.”140 The rules also set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered to determine 
whether a particular use is equitable and reasonable.141 
The Helsinki Rules were the foundation upon which a holistic legal framework to govern 
international watercourses was developed.142 The rules ushered in the era of modern international 
water law.143 This was possible because the ILA developed the Helsinki Rules for navigational as 
well as non-navigational uses of water resources after a judicious and empirical evaluation of 
prevailing state practices with respect to water apportionment.144 This effort was meant to establish 
rules for the reasonable sharing and management of water resources among co-riparian states.145 
In 1970, the UN General Assembly requested a study on the law of international 
watercourses.146 Two conventions followed: the 1992 UN Water Convention147 and the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention.148 There is not much that needs to be said here about the 1992 UN 
Water Convention as its focus was on the environmental protection of transboundary rivers instead 
of their utilization.149 However, the convention reaffirmed the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle by requiring states to take all appropriate measures “to ensure that transboundary waters 
are used in a reasonable and equitable way.”150 The 1997 UN Watercourses Convention attempted 
to fill in the remaining gap in the legal framework governing international watercourses.151 The 
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convention is the main UN instrument that codifies the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle in present-day international water law.152 The Watercourses Convention aimed at aiding 
the negotiation and interpretation of existing bilateral and multilateral treaties, not supplanting 
them.153  
By the time the Watercourses Convention codified the equitable and reasonable utilization 
and no significant harm principles, those principles had already attained the status of existing 
customary international law.154 The convention codified the two principles separately. In Article 
5(1), the convention stated, in relevant parts: “Watercourse States shall in their respective 
territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.”155 And in 
article 7(1), it stated that “Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in 
their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other 
watercourse States.”156 The convention reflected the equitable and reasonable utilization as the 
leading principle in international water law.157 Although the convention codified the equitable and 
reasonable utilization and no significant harm principles separately, the language used in the 
convention reflects the subordination of the no significant harm principle to the equitable and 
reasonable utilization principle.158 
The 1997 UN Watercourses Convention entered into force only in 2014.159 The fact that 
only 16 states signed the convention when it was open for signature and that it took more than 17 
years for its entry into force is indicative of the international community’s dissatisfaction with it.160 
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Because the convention was taking such a longtime to enter into force, in 2004, the ILA convened 
in Berlin to synthesize customary international water law.161 The result was the Berlin Rules162. 
The Berlin Rules were intended to set out the latest principles governing all aspects of freshwater 
resources.163  
The Berlin Rules superseded the 1966 Helsinki Rules.164 However, the rules kept intact the 
equitable and reasonable utilization principle, along with its factors. The latest formulation of the 
equitable and reasonable utilization principle as set out in article 12 of the Berlin Rules provides: 
1. Basin States shall in their respective territories manage the waters of an 
international drainage basin in an equitable and reasonable manner having due 
regard for the obligation not to cause significant harm to other basin States.  
2. In particular, basin States shall develop and use the waters of the basin in 
order to attain the optimal and sustainable use thereof and benefits therefrom, 
taking into account the interests of other basin States, consistent with adequate 
protection of the waters.165 
The Berlin Rules also set out a list of non-exhaustive factors to be used to determine 
equitable and reasonable utilization. Article 13 provides: 
1. Equitable and reasonable use within the meaning of Article 12 is to be 
determined through consideration of all relevant factors in each particular case. 
2. Relevant factors to be considered include, but are not limited to: 
a. Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, hydrogeological, climatic, 
ecological, and other natural features; 
b. The social and economic needs of the basin States concerned; 
c. The population dependent on the waters of the international drainage basin in 
each basin State; 
d. The effects of the use or uses of the waters of the international drainage basin 
in one basin State upon other basin States; 
e. Existing and potential uses of the waters of the international drainage basin; 
f. Conservation, protection, development, and economy of use of the water 
resources of the international drainage basin and the costs of measures taken to 
achieve these purposes; 
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g. The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to the particular planned 
or existing use; 
h. The sustainability of proposed or existing uses; and 
i. The minimization of environmental harm. 
3. The weight of each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison 
with other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable 
use, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached 
on the basis of the whole. 166 
II. THE LEGAL REGIME IN THE BLUE NILE BASIN 
The 1966 Helsinki Rules defined an international drainage basin as “a geographical area 
extending over two or more States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, 
including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus.”167 The 1997 
Watercourses Convention defined an international watercourse as “a watercourse parts of which 
are situated in different States.”168 The 2004 Berlin Rules defined an international drainage basin 
as “a drainage basin extending over two or more States.”169 The Blue Nile river flows from 
Ethiopia, passes through Sudan and Egypt, and terminates in the Mediterranean Sea. By any 
accepted definition of the term, it is an international river governed by international law.  
The 2015 GERD Agreement 
International agreements, state practice and judicial decisions show the wide acceptance of 
the equitable and reasonable utilization principle.170 The legal regime in the Blue Nile basin is no 
different. Although the three basin states took their time in accepting the prevailing equitable and 
reasonable utilization principle, there is now an agreement among them that utilization should be 
based on that principle. In 2015, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan concluded the 2015 GERD 
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Agreement.171 This is the only agreement all three Blue Nile basin states signed on the Nile waters 
issue. 
The GERD Agreement relies on the equitable and reasonable utilization principle as an 
allocation strategy.172 It can be discerned from the agreement’s language that it borrowed a great 
deal from the equitable and reasonable utilization factors set out in the Berlin Rules.173 Principle 
IV provides: 
The three countries shall utilize their shared water resources in their respective 
territories in an equitable and reasonable manner. 
In ensuring their equitable and reasonable utilization, the three countries will 
take into account all the relevant guiding factors listed below, but not limited to 
the following outlined: 
a.  Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other 
factors of a natural character; 
b. The social and economic needs of the Basin States concerned; 
c. The population dependent on the water resources in each Basin State;  
d. The effects of the use or uses of the water resources in one Basin State on 
other Basin States;  
e. Existing and potential uses of the water resources;  
f. Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water 
resources and the costs of measures taken to that effect;  
g. The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned 
or existing use;  
h. The contribution of each Basin State to the waters of the Nile River system;  
i. The extent and proportion of the drainage area in the territory of each Basin 
State.174 
Even without the GERD Agreement, the equitable and reasonable utilization principle 
would apply to the Blue Nile river as customary international law.175 Although the Berlin Rules 
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setting out the latest version of the principle have customary law status, for the purpose of the 
present dispute, the GERD Agreement’s formulation of the principle is preferred. 
Before the 2015 agreement, there was no inclination among Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to 
collectively accept the equitable and reasonable utilization principle. This can be read from 
Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s refusal to sign the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention which codified the 
equitable and reasonable utilization principle.176 Furthermore, their diversion from the global trend 
is discernable in the several agreements predating the 2015 GERD Agreement.  
Pre-GERD Agreements 
In the years before the 2015 GERD Agreement, states with various interests in the Nile 
waters, some not even situated in the Nile river basin, concluded several seemingly incompatible 
agreements. This inevitably led to “fragmented legal regimes”177. These are agreements concluded 
in 1891, 1902, 1929, 1959, 1993, and 2010. The first four agreements preceded the first 
codification of the equitable and reasonable utilization principle in the 1966 Helsinki Rules.178 The 
last agreement was concluded after the equitable and reasonable utilization principle was codified 
for the second time in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention179 but before the convention’s entry 
into force in 2014180. 
In 1891, anticipating its own sphere of influence in East Africa, Italy signed a protocol with 
Britain agreeing not to build dams on the Nile river or use its waters for irrigation.181 However, 
Ethiopian victory over Italy in 1896 gave Ethiopia “standing to reject the Protocol signed by Italy 
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on its behalf.”182 Another agreement Ethiopia would end up rejecting is the 1902 treaty183. Unlike 
the 1891 treaty which Italy on its own accord signed on Ethiopia’s behalf, Ethiopia itself signed 
the 1902 treaty with the United Kingdom. This treaty concerned boundary arrangements between 
British and Italian colonies in the East African region and Ethiopia. This agreement contained a 
provision that required Ethiopia to obtain permission from the British government before 
constructing any work across the Blue Nile which would arrest its flow. Article III stated: 
His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself 
towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct, or allow to be 
constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana, or the Sobat which would 
arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic 
Majesty’s Government and the Government of the Soudan [sic].
184  
As independent sovereigns, the United Kingdom’s and Ethiopia’s status as parties to the 
1902 agreement is clear. What is not so clear is the status of Egypt and Sudan with respect to the 
agreement. Egypt was not mentioned in the agreement but Sudan was. All the same, at the time 
the agreement was concluded, both were under British rule.185 According to the law of state 
succession codified in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties186 
(VCSST), a newly independent state may not establish its status as a party to any multilateral treaty 
if the consent of all the parties is required.187 Conveniently enough, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia 
have all signed the VCSST: Ethiopia and Sudan signed the convention on August 23, 1978, 
Ethiopia ratifying the VCSST on May 28, 1980. Egypt acceded to the VCSST on July 17, 1986. 
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None of them made any reservations to the convention. The VCSST entered into force on 
November 6, 1996.188 
According to the VCSST, when Egypt and Sudan gained their independence from Britain, 
as newly independent states they could have established their status as parties to the 1902 treaty 
by giving a notification of succession to the original parties to the treaty – the United Kingdom 
and Ethiopia.189 Moreover, because the 1902 treaty required the consent of the UK and Ethiopia, 
the newly independent states of Egypt and Sudan could not have succeeded Britain to establish 
their status as parties to the treaty without Ethiopia’s consent.190 This was not possible for Egypt 
and Sudan to do because on September 11, 1952, Ethiopia declared the 1902 treaty null and void.191 
Then came the 1929 agreement between the United Kingdom and Egypt192. By 1929, 
Britain had added Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda to her list of colonies which had 
previously included Egypt and Sudan.193 Some consider the 1929 agreement as “yet another 
attempt by the British to secure the Nile’s flow to Egypt, after Britain’s failure to control Lake 
Tana”.194 The agreement was concerned with the use of the Nile waters for irrigation.195 The 
agreement allocated 57% of the Nile’s waters to Egypt.196 Without naming any names, it also 
demanded that any projects by upstream states that might alter the flow of the Nile be approved 
 
188 See supra note 186. 
189 VCSST, supra note 186, 17(1). 
190 Id., 17(3). 
191 Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, at 12, (Apr. 13, 2002). 
192 Exchange of Notes Between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government in 
Regard to the Use of Waters of the River Nile for Irrigation Purposes, U.K.-Egypt, May 7, 1929, 93 L.N.T.S. 44 
[hereinafter 1929 Agreement]. 
193 See Udobong, supra note 49, at 481.  
194 Id., at 467.  
195 See 1929 Agreement, supra note 192. 




by Egypt.197 The 1929 agreement provides no explanation as to the origin and content of such 
rights for Egypt on the waters of the Nile.198 
Customary law is one of the sources of international law.199 According to the customary 
law of treaties codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties200 (VCLT), the parties to 
the 1929 agreement must perform it in good faith.201 Ethiopia did not consent to be bound by the 
agreement and is therefore not bound by it.202 Parenthetically, the VCLT is being used here and 
throughout this paper in a manner that is consistent with the International Court’s usage. The rules 
for treaty interpretation set out in the VCLT are used even for those treaties that preceded the 
VCLT.203 
Sudan was resentful about the 1929 agreement and after independence, it reached a new 
agreement with Egypt.204 Sudan considered the 1929 agreement invalid for the simple reason that, 
though it was named in the agreement, it was not a party to it.205 The new agreement between 
Sudan and Egypt was the 1959 agreement206. This agreement sought to secure the existing 
hegemony enjoyed by Egypt over the Nile by raising Egypt’s share of the waters to 66% of the 
Nile’s total flow.207 
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According to its preamble, the reason for the 1959 agreement was because the 1929 
agreement did not allow the complete control of the Nile River by Egypt and Sudan: “as the Nile 
waters Agreement concluded in 1929 provided only for the partial use of the Nile waters and did 
not extend to include a complete control of the River waters, the two Republics have agreed on the 
following. . . .”208 The agreement outlined the acquired rights of Egypt and Sudan as 48 BCM and 
4 BCM of the Nile waters, respectively.209 In what one scholar dubbed “a staggering dismissal of 
third-party rights”210, the 1959 Agreement provided for the Nile River’s “full control and for 
increasing its yield for the full utilization of its waters by the Republic of the Sudan and the United 
Arab Republic” and the need to reach “full agreement and co-operation between the two Republics 
in order to regulate their benefits and utilize the Nile waters in a manner which secures the present 
and future requirements of the two countries”.211 The United Arab Republic was a joint entity 
formed by the union of Egypt and Syria in 1958.212 The union had lasted until 1961.213 The 1959 
agreement says nothing about how Syria was to be provided with the Nile waters. 
The 1959 agreement divided the entire flow of the Nile between Egypt and Sudan, ignoring 
any potential demand by the states which supply the water.214 Article II, paragraph 4 divided the 
full Nile waters between Egypt and Sudan, designating 55.5 BCM for  Egypt and 18.5 BCM for 
Sudan.215 The agreement even envisaged “perpetual applicability” which does not allow for 
termination by either Egypt or Sudan, the only parties to the agreement.216 At any rate, the 1959 
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agreement is not binding upon Ethiopia for the same reason the 1929 agreement is not binding 
upon it: Ethiopia did not consent to be bound by the agreement.217 
The 1959 agreement created a set of rights and obligations between Egypt and Sudan and 
nobody else.218 When concluding the 1959 agreement, Egypt and Sudan “did not even consult 
Ethiopia, the source of the vast majority of the Nile’s water.”219 However, Egypt and Sudan 
consider their rights under the 1929 and 1959 agreements as non-negotiable.220 The Egyptian 
government went as far as enshrining what it considers are its historic water rights in Egypt’s new 
constitution adopted in 2013.221 Most of the Nile riparian states, with the understandable exception 
of Egypt, vehemently oppose recognition of the 1929 and 1959 agreements which essentially 
ensure an Egyptian veto power on all water projects on the Nile.222 A “right of assent” or a “right 
of veto” could paralyze a state’s exercise of its territorial jurisdiction.223 
For a time, the upstream nations tolerated the 1959 agreement mainly because of the fact 
that they had other water resources, while Sudan and Egypt were arid places.224 But soon enough, 
several Nile basin states came together to negotiate an agreement which would replace the 1929 
and 1959 agreements.225 To the nine Nile basin states, the two agreements meant an inequitable 
allocation of the Nile waters.226 In 1995, Nile basin states’ opposition to the 1929 and 1959 
arrangements led to the creation of the Basin Action Plan (BAP).227 The plan’s purpose was to 
 
217 See supra note 202. 
218 Wendl, supra note 198, at 12.  
219 Richards, supra note 26, at 14.  
220 Mekonnen, supra note 36, at 258.  
221 Tamar Meshel, Swimming against the Current, supra note 48, at 138-39. 
222 Wendl, supra note 198, at 41.  
223 Boute, supra note 91, at 399-400. 
224 Richards, supra note 26, at 16.  
225 Chelkaba, supra note 20, at 167. 
226 See supra note 222, at 10.  




establish a basin-wide legal framework.228 In 1999, the BAP lead to the creation of the Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI).229 The NBI aimed at correcting the unreasonableness of the 1929 and 1959 
agreements.230 This effort would eventually culminate in an agreement  in 2010.231 
The 2010 Nile Basin Agreement232 was modeled after the 1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention.233 The agreement relies on the equitable and reasonable utilization principle as an 
allocation strategy.234 Article 4(1) provides, in relevant parts: “Nile Basin States shall in their 
respective territories utilize the water resources of the Nile River System in an equitable and 
reasonable manner.”235 Article 4(2) lists the factors that must be taken into account to ensure 
equitable and reasonable utilization:  
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other 
factors of a natural character; 
(b) The social and economic needs of the Basin States concerned; 
(c) The population dependent on the water resources in each Basin State; 
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the water resources in one Basin State on 
other Basin States; 
(e) Existing and potential uses of the water resources; 
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water 
resources and the costs of measures taken to that effect; 
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned 
or existing use; 
(h) The contribution of each Basin State to the waters of the Nile River system; 
(i) The extent and proportion of the drainage area in the territory of each Basin 
State.236 
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Six Nile riparian states signed the 2010 Nile Basin Agreement, namely Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and Burundi.237 Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania have ratified the 
agreement.238 Egypt and Sudan were conspicuously absent at the signing of the 2010 agreement. 
Egypt refused to sign the agreement because it saw it as a “counter-hegemonic device”239. 
Under customary treaty law codified in the VCLT, there are times when “third states” 
which are not parties to an agreement may have some rights under an agreement: 
A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the 
treaty intend the provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a 
group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents 
thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless 
the treaty otherwise provides.240 
The parties to the 2010 Nile Basin Agreement intended the treaty to accord rights to a group 
of states called the “Nile Basin States”.241 The agreement defines a “Nile Basin State” as a State 
party to the agreement in whose territory the Nile River Basin is situated.242 Egypt and Sudan were 
not parties to the 2010 Nile Basin Agreement.243 Therefore, the agreement cannot intend to accord 
them any rights.  
A couple of years before the creation of the Nile Basin Action Plan in 1995244, Egypt and 
Ethiopia reached their first agreement regarding the uses of the Blue Nile river.245 The agreement 
provided a framework for water use, including a provision requiring each party to refrain from 
causing appreciable harm to the interest of the other party. Article 5 of the 1993 Agreement 
provides: “Each party shall refrain from engaging in any activity related to the waters that may 
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cause appreciable harm to the interests of the other party.”246 There was not a word about equitable 
and reasonable utilization, a principle codified in the Helsinki Rules as far back as 1966.247 But 
this was a step in the right direction. In 2015, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan would conclude the 
GERD Agreement.248 
Under customary treaty law, a later treaty concluded on the same subject matter can 
terminate a prior treaty. Article 59(1)(a) of VCLT provides: “A treaty shall be considered as 
terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject matter and it 
appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the matter 
should be governed by that treaty.”249 Therefore, the 1993 Agreement can be considered as having 
been terminated by the 2015 GERD Agreement. 
Legal Effect of the 2015 GERD Agreement 
Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan signed the 2015 GERD Agreement.250 A state that has signed a 
treaty subject to ratification is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of the treaty.251 While there is no obligation for Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to perform the 
GERD Agreement in good faith before ratification,252 they have the obligation not to defeat its 
object and purpose.253 
Under customary treaty law codified in the VCLT, a state’s obligation when it has only 
signed an agreement is quite different from its obligation when it has signed and ratified the 
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agreement.254 When a state has only signed an agreement, its obligation falls under article 18(a), 
which provides:  
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose 
of a treaty when it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting 
the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made 
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.255 
When a state has signed and ratified an agreement, its obligation falls under article 26 of 
VCLT, which provides: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”256  
It may be worth mentioning, the VCLT provisions apply to a treaty and under article 
2(1)(a), ““treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation.”257 In the present matter, regardless of what 
the parties to the GERD Agreement decided to call their agreement, whether they decided to call 
it an agreement on declaration of principles or otherwise, their agreement is a treaty under article 
2(1)(a) of the VCLT. This is also true for all the other agreements mentioned in this paper.  
Based on the foregoing, two conclusions can be drawn: first, when a state has only signed 
an agreement, a violation of a provision of that agreement becomes a violation of the state’s 
obligation under article 18(a) of the VCLT if the violation defeats the object and purpose of the 
agreement; and second, when a state has signed and ratified an agreement, the violation of a 
provision of that agreement is automatically a violation of the state’s treaty obligation under article 
26 of the VCLT.  
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Since Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan only signed the GERD Agreement, their obligations with 
respect to it fall under article 18(a) of the VCLT. That is, they have the obligation to refrain from 
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the agreement. The object and purpose of the 
2015 GERD Agreement is to commit Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to certain principles on the 
Ethiopian dam project, including the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.258 The 
preamble to the agreement also states: “cognizant of the significance of the River Nile as the source 
of livelihood and the significant resource to the development of the people of Egypt, Ethiopia and 
Sudan, the three countries have committed to the following principles on the GERD.”259 One of 
the principles the three states committed to is the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization.260 Since they have signed the GERD Agreement, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan have the 
obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the equitable and reasonable utilization of the 
waters of the Blue Nile river. 
III. ETHIOPIA’S FIRST FILLING OF THE GERD VIOLATED THE EQUITABLE 
AND REASONABLE UTILIZATION PRINCIPLE 
The equitable and reasonable utilization principle is a fundamental pillar of international 
water law261 and has customary law status262. The principle applies to the Nile river as customary 
international law.263 In the GERD Agreement, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan agreed on the customary 
international law principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.264 Since the three states signed 
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but did not ratify the GERD Agreement, each state’s obligation is to refrain from acts which would 
defeat the equitable and reasonable utilization principle.265 
What Equitable and Reasonable Utilization Means 
Principle IV, paragraph 1 of the GERD Agreement requires Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to 
utilize the Blue Nile river in an equitable and reasonable manner.266 
A treaty is interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.267 Together with the context of the treaty, 
any relevant rules of international law applicable in relations between the parties are taken into 
account.268 According to article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, judicial decisions can be used as 
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”.269 It should be kept in mind, all the ICJ 
cases used here are used simply to illuminate a rule of law; they are not used as binding precedent. 
The parties to the present dispute – Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, were not parties in any of the cases 
cited below. Article 59 of the ICJ Statute provides, “The decision of the Court has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”270 Therefore, the ICJ decisions 
have no binding force on the parties in the present dispute but can serve as subsidiary means to 
determine the rules of law. 
The ICJ addressed the issue of equitable and reasonable utilization in only two cases: in 
1997, it ruled on the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
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dam project on the Danube river.271 And in 2010, it ruled on the dispute between Argentina and 
Uruguay concerning pulp mills on the Uruguay river.272 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros involved a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia about a 
hydroelectric dam project on the Danube river. In 1977, Hungary and Czechoslovakia signed a 
treaty for the joint investment and construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric dam 
on the Danube river. In 1989, Hungary backed out of the joint project. Czechoslovakia came up 
with an alternative plan to divert the Danube from flowing to Hungary, and to generate electricity 
on Czechoslovak territory. In 1991, Czechoslovakia began the diversion and Hungary sued at the 
ICJ. Slovakia carried on the dispute after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993.273 The ICJ 
approved of the equitable and reasonable utilization principle and confirmed its status as a general 
rule of international law274, and a guiding principle of international water law.275 The Court found 
that unilateral control of a shared resource by one riparian state deprived another riparian state its 
right to an equitable and reasonable share of a river.276 The Court also held that a state’s right to 
unilaterally build a dam on a shared watercourse within its territory was subject to limitations.277 
The Court’s decision in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros renders unilateral control of a shared resource by 
a state a depravation of another state’s share in the equitable and reasonable utilization of the 
shared resource:  
The Court considers that Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control of a 
shared resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and 
reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube - with the continuing 
effects of the diversion of these waters on the ecology of the riparian area of the 
 
271 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) [hereinafter Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros]. 
272 Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20) [hereinafter Pulp Mills]. 
273 See generally Gabcikovo-Nagymaros supra note 271.  
274 Bode, supra note 89, at 102.   
275 Meshel, Swimming against the Current, supra note 48, at 157. 
276 Id., at 172.  




Szigetkoz - failed to respect the proportionality which is required by international 
law.278 
Whether Ethiopia Assumed Unilateral control of the Blue Nile River 
 In Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, the ICJ found that the diversion of 90% of the Danube waters 
for hydroelectric generation violated the equitable and reasonable utilization principle.279 In the 
present matter, Ethiopia diverted 4.9 BCM of the waters of the Blue Nile river.280 This comes to 
about 5.8% of the Nile’s annual flow of 84 BCM.281 On its face, the Court’s decision in Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros would seem to indicate that the diversion of 5.8% of total annual flow would not 
violate the equitable and reasonable utilization principle. Moreover, Czechoslovakia’s diversion 
of the Danube lasted for years282, whereas Ethiopia’s diversion of the Blue Nile lasted for no more 
than seven days283. Therefore, it is not clear whether Ethiopia assumed unilateral control of the 
Blue Nile river. This is why the equitable and reasonable utilization principle is sometimes 
considered to be fair but too vague and indeterminate to be effective.284 Further reading into the 
Court’s decision to extract meaning that would be applicable to the present case would be 
speculative at best. Such absence of guidance is one reason why the disagreements over whether 
unilateral activities may or may not be equitable and reasonable are endless.285 
Whether Ethiopia Took Into Account the Existing Uses of the Blue Nile River 
Upper riparian states cannot ignore the interests of lower riparian states when 
implementing projects that may affect the flow of water to the lower riparian states.286 However, 
the right to have its interests taken into account, does not entail a state’s right to veto projects for 
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the exploitation of water resources.287 In its 2010 decision in the Pulp Mills case, the ICJ took the 
position that equitable and reasonable utilization required a state to take into account the interests 
of another riparian state in the shared resource.288  
Pulp Mills involved a dispute between Argentina and Uruguay. In 1975, Argentina and 
Uruguay signed a treaty for jointly achieving the optimum and rational utilization of the Uruguay 
river. Then in 2005, Uruguay started building two pulp mills on the Uruguay river. Argentina 
feared the pulp mills would affect the quality of the waters of the river and sued Uruguay at the 
ICJ.289 The Court held that states must take into account the interests of other states in utilizing a 
shared resource: “utilization could not be considered to be equitable and reasonable if the interests 
of the other riparian State in the shared resource and the environmental protection of the latter were 
not taken into account.”290 Pulp Mills put the taking into account of another state’s interest at the 
center of the determination of whether a particular utilization is equitable and reasonable.291 
When Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan agreed on the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization, they also agreed on the factors which would determine whether utilization is equitable 
and reasonable.292 As was shown above, the factors in the GERD Agreement were taken from 
prevailing customary international water law, specifically article 13 of the Berlin Rules293.  One of 
the factors of principle IV the three states agreed on is factor (e) which requires them to take into 
account “existing and potential uses of the water resources”.294 
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An argument can be made that during its first filling of the GERD, Ethiopia took into 
account some of the interests of the downstream states by publicizing in advance its plans and by 
conducting the first filling during the rainy season.295 Moreover, while Ethiopia impounded 5.8% 
of the waters of the Blue Nile river, it did not stop the entire water flow to the downstream states.296 
However, factor (e)’s requirement to take into account existing uses deserves a closer look. 
Existing Uses in the Nile Basin 
Since the third millennium B.C.E., Egyptian civilization flourished on the Nile, leading to 
Egyptian domination of the political and economic interests of the river.297 In modern times, the 
1929 and 1959 agreements are the basis upon which Egypt and Sudan claim historical rights over 
the entire flow of the Nile river.298 Egypt maintains that the historic treaties which gave it 
monopoly over the Nile river are binding on the other Nile basin states.299 Egypt even argues it 
needs more water than was allocated to it in the 1959 Agreement.300 While Ethiopia emphasizes 
its right to an equitable share of the Nile waters, Egypt stresses what it calls its “historic” rights to 
the river.301 
The irony of  the 1929 and 1959 agreements is that those riparian states which contribute 
no water to the Nile river make the most claims to its waters: “Although the Nile is shared by 11 
riparian states with burgeoning populations and economies highly dependent on agriculture, the 
status quo vests Egypt and Sudan - downstream riparian states with little or negative contribution 
- with exclusive right over the entire flow.”302 Some scholars take the position that, by adhering to 
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the 1929 and 1959 agreements, Egypt and Sudan have shown their determination to deny the 
upstream riparian states any right in consumptive utilization of the Nile waters.303 Even for their 
time, the inequitable arrangement of the 1929 and 1959 agreements had no basis in international 
water law.304 As far back as the 1911 Madrid Declaration and the 1923 Hydraulic Power 
Convention, cooperation between all riparian states was the accepted international norm.305 
Both the 1929 and the 1959 agreements created an Egyptian monopoly of the waters of the 
Nile and excluded Ethiopia’s interests.306 As shown above, Ethiopia did not consent to be bound 
by the 1929 and 1959 agreements, and therefore, is not bound by them.307 However, by agreeing 
to factor (e) in principle IV of the GERD Agreement, Ethiopia agreed to take into account existing 
uses which were set up by the 1929 and 1959 agreements. Regardless of how unfair the 
arrangements under those agreements were, Ethiopia agreed to take into account the existing uses 
of the Blue Nile waters.308 
Under the equitable and reasonable utilization principle, all riparian nations on an 
international river are alike entitled to an equitable apportionment of water from the common 
river.309 That means Ethiopia, just like Egypt and Sudan, is entitled to an equitable share of the 
waters. Equitable and reasonable utilization does not guarantee each riparian state an equal share 
of water from an international watercourse; rather, it guarantees each state an equal right to an 
equitable share of the uses and benefits of an international watercourse.310 The equitable and 
reasonable utilization principle is rooted in the sovereign equality states have in their dealings with 
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each other.311 The principle imposes a limitation on a state's sovereignty; that is, a state is unable 
to unilaterally exacerbate the risks or impacts of a reduction in water by using more than its fair 
share of an international river.312 If nothing else, the equitable and reasonable utilization principle 
prohibits any one basin state from monopolizing the supply of an international river.313 The 
existing uses established by the 1929 and 1959 agreements deny the nine Nile basin states any 
right to the waters.314 That is why the Nile basin states, including Ethiopia, came together to 
negotiate the 2010 agreement.315 
The question that needs to be asked at this juncture is: Despite its objections to the 1929 
and 1959 agreements, did Ethiopia waive its objections when it signed the GERD Agreement and 
agreed to take into account existing uses of the Blue Nile river? 
Whether Ethiopia was a “Persistent Objector” with respect to the 1929 and 1959 Agreements 
Under customary international law, a rule is not opposable to a state that has objected the 
rule while the rule was in the process of formation, provided the state’s objection was maintained 
persistently:  
1. Where a State has objected to a rule of customary international law while 
that rule was in the process of formation, the rule is not opposable to the State 
concerned for so long as it maintains its objection.   
2. The objection must be clearly expressed, made known to other States, and 
maintained persistently.316 
Applying the persistent objector rule in the Asylum Case, the ICJ stated: “The Party which 
relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it 
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has become binding on the other Party.”317 Based on the ICJ’s formulation of the rule, Egypt and 
Sudan must prove that the existing uses of the Blue Nile river established by the 1929 and 1959 
agreements have become binding upon Ethiopia. As already mentioned, Ethiopia has not 
consented to be bound by these agreements.318  
The persistent objector rule raises the question whether the water use arrangements made 
in the 1929 and 1959 agreements gave rise to a rule of customary international law. Customary 
international law requires a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris).319 General 
practice refers to the practice of states that contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of 
customary international law,320 including diplomatic acts and correspondence321. Opinio Juris 
refers to the acceptance of state practice as law, including through treaty provisions.322 
The state practice in the Blue Nile basin, at least until the construction of the GERD, 
showed that Egypt and Sudan had total control of the Nile waters.323 This was the case since ancient 
times.324 However, the Nile basin states, including Ethiopia, have objected to the full utilization of 
the Nile waters by Egypt and Sudan only.325 In other words, the opinio juris requirement of 
acceptance of state practice as law is missing. Therefore, the water use arrangements made in the 
1929 and 1959 agreements did not give rise to a rule of customary international law. That is, the 
persistent objector rule which might have allowed Ethiopia to claim a status as a persistent objector 
to the existing uses set up in the 1929 and 1959 agreements is inapplicable to the present case. 
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Assuming arguendo the 1929 and 1959 arrangements gave rise to a rule of customary 
international law, Ethiopia would still not be able to claim a status as a persistent objector to those 
arrangements. In its comments to article 15 of the Draft Conclusions on Customary Law, the ILC 
stated: “The requirement that the objection be maintained persistently applies both before and after 
the rule of customary international law has emerged.”326 By agreeing to take into account the 
existing uses of the Blue Nile river as required in the GERD Agreement,327 Ethiopia’s persistent 
objection to the existing uses ceases to be persistent. 
This may sound inequitable considering the fact that Ethiopia contributes about 86% of the 
Nile’s total water flow328. At the base of the equitable and reasonable utilization principle is the 
notion that all countries are sovereign nations and that no state is superior to another.329 Because 
all countries are equal, the only way they have a right to use a collective resource like an 
international river is collectively, with no riparian state having more rights than another on the 
same river.330 However, the language of the GERD agreement is quite clear: Egypt, Ethiopia and 
Sudan agreed to take into account existing uses.331 
Some scholars suggest that the equitable and reasonable utilization principle imposes on 
states a duty to refrain from acting inconsistently with the interests of other states.332 That may be 
true, but also true is the fact that a state knows or should know better than anyone else what is in 
its own interest. Ethiopia decided it was in its interest to sign the GERD Agreement. Ethiopia 
decided it was in its interest to take into account the existing uses of the Blue Nile river. 
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According to the existing uses of the Blue Nile river before the first filling of the GERD, 
Egypt and Sudan used to get 100% of the waters of the Blue Nile river.333 During the first filling, 
Ethiopia impounded 4.9 BCM of water from the Blue Nile river.334 Ethiopia has the obligation to 
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the GERD Agreement. The object 
and purpose of the GERD Agreement was, inter alia, to commit Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to the 
equitable and reasonable utilization principle by having them take into account the existing uses 
of the Blue Nile river. By impounding 4.9 BCM of water, Ethiopia failed to take into account the 
existing uses of the river. 
Taken together, the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros and Pulp Mills decisions illustrate that: (1) a 
state’s assumption of unilateral control of a shared resource deprives the other states of their share 
in the equitable and reasonable utilization of the shared resource;335 and (2) a riparian state’s 
utilization of a shared resource could not be considered to be equitable and reasonable if the 
interests of other riparian states in the shared resource were not taken into account.336 Applying 
this formulation of the equitable and reasonable utilization principle to the dispute at hand would 
mean that: first, Ethiopia may not assume unilateral control of the Blue Nile river without depriving 
Sudan and Egypt of their share in the equitable and reasonable utilization of the river; and second, 
Ethiopia’s utilization of the Blue Nile river cannot be considered to be equitable and reasonable if 
the interests of Sudan and Egypt in the river are not taken into account.  
As previously explained, from the information available at the time of writing, it is not clear 
whether Ethiopia assumed unilateral control of the Blue Nile river during the first filling of the 
GERD. What is clear, however, is that Ethiopia did not take into account the existing uses of the 
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river which give 100% of the waters of the Nile to Egypt and Sudan. Therefore, Ethiopia’s 
utilization of the waters of the Blue Nile river during the first filling of the GERD cannot be 
considered to be equitable and reasonable. That is, Ethiopia’s first filling of the GERD violated 
the equitable and reasonable utilization principle.  
To conclude that the upper riparian state contributing all the waters of an international river 
cannot touch the waters without violating the equitable and reasonable utilization principle while 
the lower riparian states use all the waters seems absurd. Granted, the absurdity is not in the 
conclusion but in the legal regime set up by the parties. 
IV. ETHIOPIA COMMITTED AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT DURING 
THE FIRST FILLING OF THE GERD 
Under customary international law codified in the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts337 (ARSIWA), a state has responsibility for every one 
of its internationally wrongful acts.338 Article 2 of ARSIWA defines the elements of an 
internationally wrongful act of a state as follows: “There is an internationally wrongful act of a 
State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under 
international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”339 For 
Ethiopia’s acts during the first filling of the GERD to be internationally wrongful, the two elements 
of article 2 must be met: first, Ethiopia’s impounding of 4.9 BCM of water from the Blue Nile 
river must be a conduct consisting of an action or omission attributable to Ethiopia under 
 
337 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement 
No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1 [hereinafter ARSIWA]. 
338 Id., art. 1. 




international law;340 and second, Ethiopia’s impounding of the water must constitute a breach of 
Ethiopia’s international obligation.341  
Conduct Attributable to Ethiopia 
When a state acknowledges a conduct and adopts it as its own, the conduct can be attributed 
to that state. Article 11 of ARSIWA provides: “Conduct which is not attributable to a State under 
the preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law 
if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.”342 
Ethiopia has acknowledged the impounding as its own conduct.343 By its own admission, the 
Ethiopian government diverted the waters of the Blue Nile river during the first filling of the GERD 
between July 15 and 22, 2020.344 These facts are uncontroverted by any party at this point. In fact, 
the Ethiopian government made it a point of honor to claim the conduct.345 Therefore, under article 
11 of ARSIWA, the impounding of 4.9 BCM of water from the Blue Nile river during the first 
filling of the GERD is a conduct attributable to Ethiopia under international law.  
Breach of Ethiopia’s International Obligation 
Having established there was indeed conduct consisting of an action or omission 
attributable to Ethiopia, the only question remaining is whether the conduct so established 
constitutes a breach of Ethiopia’s international obligation.  
As a preliminary matter, before a state’s conduct can constitute a breach of that state’s 
international obligations, there must exist international obligations that bind the state at the time 
of the conduct. Article 13 of ARSIWA provides: “An act of a State does not constitute a breach of 
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an international obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the 
act occurs.”346 As discussed already, Ethiopia has signed the GERD Agreement. As a result, it has 
the obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of that agreement.347 
The object and purpose of the GERD agreement is, among other things, to commit Egypt, Ethiopia 
and Sudan to the equitable and reasonable utilization principle.348 
According to article 12 of ARSIWA, “There is a breach of an international obligation by a 
State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, 
regardless of its origin or character.”349 By withdrawing 4.9 BCM of water from the Blue Nile 
river during the first filling of the GERD, Ethiopia violated the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle. Such breach on Ethiopia’s part is a breach of its international obligation to refrain from 
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the GERD Agreement.350  
The two elements of an internationally wrongful act of a state are met. Therefore, Ethiopia 
committed an internationally wrongful act during the first filling of the GERD. 
V. REMEDIES 
Ethiopia’s violation of the equitable and reasonable utilization principle has legal 
consequences.351 For the time being, the conduct, namely the diversion of the Blue Nile waters to 
fill the GERD, has ceased. However, Ethiopia has announced its plans to do the same thing next 
year but only on a bigger scale.352 Even if it has ceased its internationally wrongful act, Ethiopia 
still has the obligation to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition to the 
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injured parties, if circumstances so require.353 Because it has announced its plans to engage in the 
same conduct next year even on a grander scale, the circumstances do require Ethiopia to offer the 
appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition to Sudan and Egypt. However, that is not 
all that can be expected of Ethiopia.  
Under article 31 of ARSIWA, Ethiopia has the obligation to make full reparation to the 
states injured by its internationally wrongful act: “(1) The responsible State is under an obligation 
to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. (2) Injury includes 
any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State.”354 
Ethiopia is under an obligation to make full reparation to Egypt and Sudan for the injury it caused 
them through its internationally wrongful act. Egypt and Sudan have condemned what they 
characterized as Ethiopia’s unilateral conduct during the first filling of the GERD.355 However, 
there is no assertion yet by either state that it was significantly harmed by Ethiopia’s withdrawal 
of 4.9 BCM of water from the Blue Nile river between July 15 and 22, 2020. Even so, to the extent 
a state acts as if the other states do not exist at all, there is harm even if there is no physical 
damage.356  
Full reparation for injury caused by an internationally wrongful act can take the form of 
restitution, compensation or satisfaction.357 A state that engages in an internationally wrongful act 
is obligated to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, 
provided it is not materially impossible.358 This is restitution. Restitution would mean Ethiopia 
releasing the 4.9 BCM of water that is currently being held back by the GERD. Compensation is 
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another form reparation can take. A state that commits an internationally wrongful act is obligated 
to compensate the affected states, if the damage caused to them cannot be made good by 
restitution.359 However, the damage must be financially assessable.360 A state responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act has the obligation of giving satisfaction to the injured states to the 
extent their injuries cannot be made good by restitution or compensation.361 Satisfaction could 
mean an acknowledgement of the wrong, an expression of regret or a formal apology, provided 
the form is not humiliating to the responsible state.362  
Although full reparation can take any of the three forms just mentioned, it is up to the injured 
states to specify what form reparation should take.363 Assuming the damage to Egypt and Sudan 
due to Ethiopia’s withdrawal of 4.9 BCM of water from the Blue Nile river can be financially 
assessable, they would have the option of picking the form of reparation they prefer. 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Egypt and Sudan can seek relief from the ICJ. Before a proceeding at the ICJ can 
materialize, however, Egypt and Sudan would have to give a notice of their claims to Ethiopia. 
Article 43(1) of ARSIWA states: “An injured State which invokes the responsibility of another 
State shall give notice of its claim to that State.”364 At the time of writing, Sudan and Egypt have 
not yet given notice of their claims to Ethiopia. They have criticized what they called Ethiopia’s 
unilateral first filling of the GERD, but they have not yet given notice of claims to Ethiopia as 
required by article 43(1).365 The responsibility of a state may not be invoked if the claims are not 
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brought in accordance with any applicable rule relating to the nationality of claims.366 Therefore, 
Sudan and Egypt may not invoke Ethiopia’s international responsibility under ARSIWA before 
giving Ethiopia the proper notice of claims.  
If Sudan and Egypt decide to give Ethiopia notice of their claims and invoke Ethiopia’s 
responsibility for its internationally wrongful act, they can then proceed to the ICJ to seek full 
reparations from Ethiopia or a declaratory judgement. Under article 93(1) of the UN Charter, as 
members of the UN Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia are “ipso facto parties to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.”367 Each of them “undertakes to comply with the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party,”368 failing which they will be 
subject to recommendations or decisions the Security Council may take to give effect to the Court’s 
judgement.369 But before the ICJ can do anything, first it must have jurisdiction over the dispute. 
Article 36 of the ICJ Statute establishes the Court’s jurisdiction:  
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to 
it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in 
treaties and conventions in force. 
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they 
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to 
any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all 
legal disputes concerning:  
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;  
(b) any question of international law;  
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach 
of an international obligation;  
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an 
international obligation. 370 
Under article 36(1), Egypt and Sudan can refer the dispute to the ICJ and ICJ would have 
jurisdiction over the dispute if the matter involved in the dispute was “specially provided for” in 
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treaties. Two treaties are relevant here: the 2010 Nile Basin Agreement and the 2015 GERD 
Agreement.  
The 2010 Nile Basin Agreement requires the Nile Basin States to submit a dispute to the 
ICJ.  Article 34(1)(a) provides:  
In the event of a dispute between two or more Nile Basin States concerning 
the interpretation or application of the present Framework, the States concerned 
shall, in the absence of an applicable agreement between them, seek a settlement 
of the dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the following provisions:  (a) 
If the States concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation requested by one 
of them, they may jointly seek good offices, or request mediation or conciliation 
by, the Nile River Basin Commission or other third party, or agree to submit the 
dispute to arbitration, in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Council, 
or to the International Court of Justice.371 
Article 34(1)(a) would bring the present dispute under the jurisdiction of the ICJ were it not 
for this fact: The 2010 Nile Basin Agreement defines a “Nile Basin State” as “a State party to the 
present Framework in whose territory part of the Nile River Basin is situated.”372 Whereas Ethiopia 
signed and ratified the agreement, Egypt and Sudan were not parties to it.373 Therefore, for the 
purpose of article 34(1)(a), Egypt and Sudan do not qualify as Nile Basin States. Ethiopia would 
not be required to submit to the ICJ’s jurisdiction under this provision. 
The 2015 GERD Agreement has a provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes between 
Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. Principle X provides: 
The Three countries will settle disputes, arising out of the interpretation or 
implementation of this agreement, amicably through consultation or negotiation 
in accordance with the principle of good faith. If the Parties are unable to resolve 
the dispute through consultation or negotiation, they may jointly request for 
conciliation, mediation or refer the matter for the consideration of the Heads of 
State/Head of Government.374 
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 Principle X is not much consolation for Egypt and Sudan. At most, it calls for a political 
resolution of disputes by referring the issues for the consideration of the Heads of the three 
governments. Therefore, neither the 2010 Nile Basin Agreement nor the 2015 GERD Agreement 
would establish the ICJ’s jurisdiction under article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute. 
Under article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, Egypt and Sudan may refer the dispute to the ICJ for 
its interpretation of the GERD Agreement and its determination of the nature and extent of the 
necessary reparations. However, this would require Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to “declare that 
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other 
state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court.”375 Egypt and Sudan made such 
a declaration in 1957 and 1958, respectively. Ethiopia has not yet declared that it recognizes the 
ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.376 In its declaration, Egypt made no reservations in recognizing the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory.377 Sudan recognized the jurisdiction of the ICJ as 
compulsory except in “disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall 
agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement”.378 
Because Ethiopia does not recognize the ICJ’s jurisdiction as compulsory, article 36(2) of 
the ICJ Statute fails to establish the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the present dispute. Moreover, even if 
Ethiopia recognized the ICJ’s jurisdiction as compulsory, Egypt may be able to refer the dispute 
to the ICJ. However, because principle X of the GERD Agreement falls squarely under the 
language of Sudan’s reservation, Sudan will not be able to refer the dispute to the ICJ.379 
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Therefore, even if Egypt and Sudan invoke Ethiopia’s responsibility for its internationally 
wrongful act by giving Ethiopia notice of their claims, there is nothing the ICJ can do for them 
without jurisdiction. Egypt and Sudan are entitled to seek full reparations from Ethiopia. However, 
as shown above, the ICJ does not have jurisdiction over the matter. The only option open to them, 
absent Ethiopia recognizing the ICJ’s jurisdiction as compulsory, is to try to work out a political 
solution at the Head of State/Government level as required by the GERD Agreement. 
VI. TWO LESSONS FROM THE MEKONG AND INDUS RIVER BASINS 
The Nile basin countries, be it said to their credit, despite their disagreements, have accepted 
the international water law principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. The 2010 Nile Basin 
Agreement380 and the 2015 GERD Agreement381 demonstrate the Nile basin states’ acceptance of 
the equitable and reasonable utilization principle. Unlike in the Nile basin, there are river basins 
where it seems some riparian states do not even pretend to have heard of equitable and reasonable 
utilization. The Mekong and Indus river basins are good examples. Just like in the Nile basin, the 
1997 UN Watercourses Convention is not very popular in the Mekong and Indus basins: In the 
Mekong, only Vietnam is a party to the convention;382 in the Indus, neither India nor Pakistan is a 
party to the convention383. But as will be shown presently, compared to the riparian states in the 
Mekong and Indus basins, the Nile basin states seem to have traveled much further along in terms 
of living by international water law principles.  
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The Mekong River Basin 
The Mekong is the seventh largest river in Asia.384 Originating in Tibet, it flows through 
six countries: China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.385 Running for 4,350 
kilometers before emptying into the South China sea, the Mekong is the world’s 12th longest 
river.386 It drains an area of 795,000 square kilometers and discharges 457 BCM of water 
annually.387 The annual discharge comes to about six times that of the Blue Nile river.388 The 
academic literature treats the Mekong river basin as being made of two parts: an Upper Mekong 
Basin (URB) and a Lower Mekong Basin (LRB). The riparian states in the upper basin are China 
and Myanmar; the riparian states in the lower basin are Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.389  
More than sixty million people depend on the Mekong for their livelihood.390 The 
livelihood of these sixty million people is now under threat from climate change and the 
construction of hydropower dams.391 The Mekong runs along extensive coastlines and major deltas 
sitting at sea level, making it vulnerable to salt intrusion from rising sea levels.392 The other threat 
to the river is the construction of hydropower dams along both the upper and lower basins. Thus 
far, China has built eight hydropower dams in the upper basin and is planning to build at least 
twelve more.393 Chinese dam construction in the upper basin leaves downstream countries at 
China’s mercy. This was demonstrated in 2016 when Vietnam, faced with severe drought, had to 
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ask China to let it have some water. China obliged by opening the floodgates of the Jinghong Dam 
and letting water flow to Vietnam.394 China allowed Vietnam a strict ration of about 2,000 cubic 
meters of water on a daily basis between March 14 and April 10, 2016.395 China denies that drought 
in the lower basin countries has anything to do with its dam construction upstream. Instead, it 
attributes all the problems downstream to climate change.396 Over 55% of the sediment flow in the 
Mekong originates in China.397 According to UNESCO, Chinese dam construction could cause a 
94% reduction in sediment flow. The sediment and its attached organic matter are critical for 
fishing and rice farming.398 
However, China is not the only country in the Mekong basin building dams. Laos and 
Cambodia are already constructing or are planning to construct eleven dams in the lower Mekong 
basin.399 The Mekong River Commission (MRC), a body established by the 1995 Mekong River 
Basin Agreement400, estimated that the construction of the eleven dams in the lower basin would 
cause the loss of up to 42% of the fish in the river system, displace approximately 100,000 people 
and threaten food security for over 2 million people.401 This would mean a loss of about $500 
million annually due to the reduction of fish supplies. 402 
The 1995 Mekong Agreement 
The lower riparian states on the Mekong river tried to establish rules for water utilization 
by entering into an agreement. On April 5, 1995, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam signed 
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the Mekong Agreement.403 The four countries in the lower Mekong Basin who made the agreement 
are home to approximately a quarter billion people.404 Before this agreement, there was no formal 
rule governing water utilization in the basin. 
The Mekong Agreement established an intergovernmental organization – the Mekong 
River Commission (MRC) – tasked with managing the use, development, and conservation of 
resources in the Mekong River Basin.405 The upper basin countries China and Myanmar were not 
parties to the agreement. Instead, they became “dialogue partners” to the MRC in 1996. As 
dialogue partners, they are not subject to the MRC but participate in meetings and discussions on 
the development of the Mekong river.406 Because the upper riparian states China and Myanmar are 
not members of the commission, the agreement is ineffectual. Since becoming a dialogue partner 
to the MRC, China has shown no interest in joining the agreement.407 
The Mekong Agreement sets out a legal framework for cooperation among the lower 
riparian states.408 Article 5 provides, in relevant parts: “The parties agree to utilize the waters of 
the Mekong River system in a reasonable and equitable manner in their respective territories.”409 
The parties also agreed to maintain an acceptable minimum monthly flow.410 Article 11 establishes 
the MRC.411 This is all well and good, except for the fact that it is useless because the country from 
where the water flows, China, is not part of this agreement.  
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In 2016, China and the other five Mekong riparian states created the Lancang-Mekong 
Cooperation (LMC) to promote cooperation between China and the five lower Mekong riparian 
states.412 The LMC parallels the MRC. China exercises great influence over the LMC.413 
Therefore, because of Chinese influence, the LMC took the teeth out of the MRC. This is obvious 
from the strengthened relations between the upper riparian China and one of the lower riparian 
states Cambodia. In 2017, Cambodia received a $7 million Chinese grant for various preservation 
projects on the Cambodian portion of the Mekong.414 Cambodia has one of the lowest rural 
electrification rates.415 Consequently, Cambodia has some of the world's highest electricity costs 
and has thus prioritized developing hydropower dams.416 Enter China. 
Chinese dam-construction companies offer a low-cost option to carry out projects on the 
Mekong, tempting Cambodia to seek an alternative route to dam construction on the Mekong river 
by building diplomatic relations with China outside the MRC framework.417 Even before the 
formation of the LMC in 2016, as far back as 2009, China pledged $1 billion in investments to 
Cambodia’s energy sector.418 By 2016, six hydropower dams, all financed and built by Chinese 
companies, were producing 47% of Cambodia’s domestic energy production.419 As a member of 
the MRC, Cambodia should have submitted the planning and construction of these dams to the 
consultation process set out in the Mekong Agreement.420 In 2013, Cambodia refused to submit 
the construction of the Chinese-funded Lower Sesan 2 dam to the MRC’s prior consultation 
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process. When the dam is fully operational by the end of 2019 or early 2020, it will cause a 9.3% 
drop in fish stocks across the entire Mekong basin.421  
One of the other controversial fruits of China-Cambodia bilateral efforts is the Sambor 
Dam.422 This dam is designed to be the largest hydropower dam in the Mekong river basin.423 
When completed, it will create an 82 km-long reservoir.424 The LMC gives China and Cambodia 
the opportunity to bilaterally construct the Sambor Dam while bypassing the MRC consultation 
process.425 Sambor Dam poses an absolute barrier for migratory fish. The proposed dam would 
result in the loss of 95% of sediment flow and a loss of 40% of nutrient flow to the Mekong Delta 
rendering the Mekong Delta unsustainable.426 This would mean the disruption of the livelihood of 
almost 18 million people in the region.427 Vietnam’s Mekong Delta will be utterly destroyed.428 
The Mekong river experiences the largest migration of fish in the world.429 Eighty-six different 
species of long-range migratory fish which inhabit the Cambodian portion of the Mekong will be 
endangered by the dam.430 Additionally, the world’s remaining eighty or so Irrawaddy Dolphins 
will also be endangered due to noise pollution from the construction and operation of the dam.431 
Apparently, these Irrawaddy Dolphins cannot hunt or navigate with their sonar capability if their 
surrounding is too loud.432 
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The damming of the Mekong river is a significant threat to its long-term sustainability.433 
Whereas the main issue in the Blue Nile basin is water allocation among Egypt, Sudan and 
Ethiopia, the main issue in the Mekong basin is the interruption of sediment flow and fish 
migration which affects agricultural production and fishing downstream. The issues involved in 
the Blue Nile and Mekong basins seem inapposite. And the Mekong river basin is a bit more 
complex than the Blue Nile river basin since the number of difficult neighbors in the former is 
double that in the latter. However, there is at least one valuable lesson for the Blue Nile riparian 
states:  
Lower riparian states can sign as many agreements as they want amongst themselves. 
Unless somehow the law of gravity changes and water starts flowing uphill, the upper riparian 
state of an international river will always be an important source of water for a lower riparian state. 
The lower Mekong riparian states made the Mekong Agreement without the upper riparian states 
China and Myanmar.434 The consequence was, China created a parallel structure (the LMC), 
thereby rendering the agreement the lower riparian states made among themselves utterly useless. 
As is evident from the Mekong case, a consortium of lower riparian states can get nowhere without 
involving the upper riparian states. 
The Indus River Basin 
The Indus is the 12th largest river system in the world, with a discharge volume twice that 
of the Nile river.435 The Indus river system originates on the Kailash Parbat mountain in the 
southwestern Tibet Autonomous Region of China. It flows for 3,200 kilometers through the 
disputed Kashmir region before entering Pakistan and emptying into the Arabian Sea near the port 
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city of Karachi. The river covers 1.12 million square kilometers and fans out among China, 
Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Nearly two-thirds of the Indus flows through Pakistan.436  
The Indus river basin is made up of six rivers. Four of the six rivers flow from India. These 
are the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, and Beas. A fifth river, the Sutlej, flows from the Tibetan Plateau. 
A sixth river, the Kabul, flows from Afghanistan.437 Parenthetically, it would have been easier to 
think of the six rivers as tributaries since they join to form the Indus. However, article I(3) of the 
Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) specifically says they are not tributaries but rivers.438 
British colonial authorities created the modern irrigation system for what are now the states 
of India and Pakistan.439 In those days of colonial rule, the Indus river basin was administered as 
a single entity. The British started building canals in the basin in 1817.440 By 1947 when they 
relinquished control of their colonies in this region, they had turned 28 million acres of land in the 
Indus basin into irrigated land. For its time, this was the largest integrated state-controlled 
irrigation system in the world.441 Because the British administered the Indus basin as a unified 
hydrologic entity and never intended the basin to be divided among different units operated by 
different countries, the irrigation and canal infrastructure they built functioned as a single unit.442 
This hydrologic unity which had allowed the development of an extensive canal system over 130 
years of imperial rule, ended with the partition of the British colony into India and Pakistan.443  
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The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) 
Beginning in 1952, the newly independent states of India and Pakistan started negotiations 
on how to utilize the waters of the Indus river basin. The World Bank sponsored the effort. The 
negotiations eventually led to the conclusion of an agreement.444 On September 19, 1960, India 
and Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT).445 The treaty established cooperation for the 
sharing of the waters of the Indus river basin between the two states.446 India and Pakistan intended 
the IWT to fix and delimit their respective rights and obligations as this was necessary for attaining 
the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus river basin.447  
Some scholars call the arrangement established by the IWT a “hydrologic divorce”.448 In 
effect, the treaty partitions the Indus river system into two geographic portions.449 The treaty 
prescribes a simple water allocation formula between India and Pakistan: the three eastern rivers 
in the Indus basin are allotted to India and the three western rivers in the basin are allotted to 
Pakistan.450 The IWT gave Pakistan control over about 166.5 BCM of water from the three western 
rivers, while giving India control over about 40.7 BCM of water from the three eastern rivers.451 
There are exceptions to this arrangement which allow the country through which the rivers flow 
the right to utilize the waters for essential uses.452  
Article II(1) of the IWT provides: “All the waters of the Eastern Rivers shall be available 
for the unrestricted use of India, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Article.”453 The 
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treaty defines the Eastern Rivers to mean the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi taken together.454 Article II(1) 
has three main exceptions which allow Pakistan to utilize the waters of the Eastern Rivers for 
domestic use455, non-consumptive use456 and agricultural use457. The IWT defines domestic use as 
the use of water including for drinking, washing, household and municipal purposes (including 
use for household gardens) and industrial purposes.458 The treaty defines non-consumptive use as 
the use of water for navigation, fishing, etc., excluding the generation of hydroelectric power.459 
The parties are required “not to materially change” the Eastern and Western Rivers when utilizing 
the waters for non-consumptive use.460 Agricultural use under the IWT means “the use of water 
for irrigation, except for irrigation of household gardens and public recreational gardens.”461 To 
put it simply, article II(1) gives India the right to the unrestricted use of the Eastern Rivers and 
Pakistan the right to use the same for all manner of things except hydroelectric power generation. 
Article III(1) does the same thing with the Western Rivers what article II(1) does with the 
Eastern Rivers but for Pakistan. This provision provides, in relevant parts: “Pakistan shall receive 
for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers which India is under obligation to let 
flow. . . .”462 The treaty defines the Western Rivers to mean the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab taken 
together.463 Paragraph 2 of article III  obligates India to let flow all the waters of the Western 
Rivers and not to interfere with these waters, except for domestic use, non-consumptive use, 
agricultural use, and the generation of hydroelectric power.464 In other words, article III(1) gives 
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Pakistan the right to the unrestricted use of the Western Rivers and India the right to use the same 
for all manner of things, including hydroelectric power generation.  
The language in the two provisions, articles (II)(1) and III(1) of the IWT, are somewhat 
confusing. The provisions get clearer when one focuses on the hydroelectric power generation 
issue. According to article II(1), India can generate hydroelectric power on the Eastern Rivers but 
Pakistan cannot. And according to article III(1), both India and Pakistan can generate hydroelectric 
power on the Western Rivers. 
Another important feature of the IWT is the Permanent Indus Commission. Article VIII(1) 
of the IWT provides, in relevant parts:  
India and Pakistan shall each create a permanent post of Commissioner for Indus 
Waters. . . . Each commissioner will be the representative of his government for 
all matters arising out of this Treaty, and will serve as the regular channel of 
communication on all matters relating to the implementation of the Treaty. . . .465  
The two commissioners designated by India and Pakistan together form the Permanent 
Indus Commission.466 The Commission’s job is “to establish and maintain co-operative 
arrangements for the implementation of this Treaty”467 and also to settle differences.468 Article IX 
sets out specific procedures for the settlement of differences and disputes between the parties.469 
Some scholars consider the IWT as one of the world’s most successful transboundary water 
treaties which has led to decades-long cooperation between two otherwise hostile countries.470 
India and Pakistan have fought four major wars since the British quit the region: in 1947, 1965, 
1971 and 1998.471 One of the main issues India and Pakistan keep fighting over is Kashmir.472 
 
465 Id., art. VIII(1). 
466 Id., art. VIII(3). 
467 Id., art. VIII(4). 
468 Id., art. VIII(4)(b). 
469 Id., art. IX. 
470 Rossi, supra note 383, at 122-23. 
471 Qureshi, The Indus Basin, supra note 446, at 55-56.  




Neither is willing to compromise over Kashmir.473 The trouble with Kashmir is, it is a source of 
several important tributaries which feed into the Indus river system and both countries want to be 
the upper riparian state lording it over the other.474 Pakistan controls a third of Kashmir’s territory. 
Pakistan calls this territory Azad Kashmir. India controls the remaining two-thirds of Kashmir. 
India refers to this portion as Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian portion of Kashmir has major 
sources of water.475 In addition to the Kashmir issue or perhaps because of it, terrorism is the other 
issue that has embittered the two countries. India and Pakistan trade accusations whenever a 
terrorist attack occurs. When the one state is attacked, it always points to the other as being 
involved.476 However, despite their obvious dislike for one another, the governments of India and 
Pakistan have managed to keep the arrangement set out in the IWT going. This is the singular 
achievement of the treaty.477  
The IWT is an example of an agreement that succeeded in establishing cooperation 
between two enemies.478 However, Indian-Pakistani cooperation on water issues deteriorated when 
India started building dams upstream.479  
In 2005, Pakistan formally objected India’s construction of a 900-Megawatt gravity dam 
on the Chenab river in Indian-controlled Kashmir. India had formally shared its plans with Pakistan 
as far back as 1992, before starting construction of the dam in 1999. Pakistan complained India 
was trying to control the flow of the Western Rivers which the IWT reserved for Pakistan’s 
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unrestricted use.480 But as already discussed, article III(1) allows India to build hydroelectric dams 
on the Western Rivers.481  
In the 2013 Kishenganga Arbitration case, Pakistan contested India’s proposal to build a 
hydroelectric plant on the Kishenganga tributary of the Jhelum river in Indian-controlled Jammu 
and Kashmir.482 India’s plan was to divert the waters through a tunnel to an electric power station 
and then return the waters to a lower tributary of the Jhelum. Pakistan was at the time planning its 
own hydroelectric power plant downstream. Pakistan sought arbitration because it saw the Indian 
project as affecting its own project downstream by altering the natural flow of the Jhelum tributary. 
The Court of Arbitration granted a partial award. The partial award allowed India to carry on its 
project, provided: (1) it did not permanently alter the full flow of the river to its natural channel; 
and (2) it took into account existing Pakistani uses. The Court also held that India must maintain 
a minimum flow, the amount of which would be determined in a final award.483 In the final award, 
the Court stated that the IWT cannot be substituted by customary international water law because 
the treaty expressly limited the extent to which the Court may apply sources of law beyond the 
treaty itself.484 The World Bank, the original sponsor of the IWT, proposed the appointment of a 
neutral expert per article IX(2) of the treaty. The Neutral Expert, a Swiss engineer, assessed 
Pakistan’s complaint485 and ultimately found for India486.   
India has twenty-seven water storage projects and dams in the area of the Western Rivers 
which are of concern to Pakistan.487 The most prominent of these Indian projects and dams are the 
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Kishenganga dam on the Neelum and Jhelum rivers, the Baglihar, Ratle, Salal and Dul Husti dams 
on the Chenab river, and the Wullar Barrage on the Indus river.488 According to Pakistan, these 
projects significantly affect the natural flow of water in the Western Rivers, and therefore, are a 
threat to Pakistani irrigation.489 As discussed above, the dispute around the Kishenganga dam 
ended with the Court of Arbitration’s final award which allowed the Indian project to proceed.  
Pakistan contends Indian water storage facilities and dams along the Western Rivers have 
the capacity to deprive it of water.490 Pakistan maintains, these Indian facilities have the potential 
to cause it significant harm by substantially decreasing the flow of water to the Western Rivers.491 
Pakistan’s contention is not without some foundation. In a September 2016 national security 
meeting held following a terror attack in Uri, a town in the Indian portion of Kashmir, Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi promised to stop the Indus river from flowing to Pakistan and instead to 
bring it to Indian households. Mr. Modi observed, “Blood and water cannot flow together.”492 His 
government takes the position that stopping the flow of water to Pakistan would not violate the 
Indus Waters Treaty.493  
Technically, Mr. Modi’s plan to bring the waters of the Indus into Indian households does 
not violate the IWT. Article III(2) allows India to utilize the Western Rivers for domestic use. The 
IWT defines domestic use to include drinking, washing, household and municipal purposes.494 So, 
the Prime Minister’s plan to bring the waters of the Western Rivers to Indian households is literally 
allowed by the IWT. Pakistan’s concern is not that such Indian activities violate the IWT. Its 
concern is that Indian dams would affect water supply downstream even if such dams met the 
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technical letter of the treaty. Pakistan also argues, when not diverting water, India weaponizes it 
by releasing torrents without notice, causing floods in Pakistan.495 India considers this argument 
as nothing but typical Pakistani obstructionism.496 However, despite the never-ending back-and-
forth between India and Pakistan, the IWT serves as a durable example of international law’s 
ability to promote cooperation even among archrivals.497  
The lesson the Blue Nile basin countries should take from the Mekong basin is that the 
lower riparian countries can get nowhere by agreeing amongst themselves and excluding the upper 
riparian countries. The lesson the Blue Nile basin countries should take from the Indus river basin 
is that the upper riparian countries must accept the fact that the lower riparian countries will never 
stop complaining no matter what. The upper riparian states must learn to live with this fact and 
must simply carry on with their lawful projects. Pakistan does not argue India violated the IWT. 
Instead, it argues it needs more water despite the arrangement set out by the treaty. When there is 
no treaty that accounts for the interests of both the upper and lower riparian states, as was clear 
from the Mekong case, there will be a dispute. And even when there is an agreement that divides 
the waters between the upper and lower riparian states, as shown in the Indus basin case, there will 
still be a dispute. The planet is not producing more water than it already has. Unless by some 
miracle water can be turned into more water – arguably a more useful miracle than the one that 
turned water into something else, all riparian states must face the fact that, regardless of the 
arrangements they set out in their water treaties, available water resources will be decreasing. 
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VII. ARGUMENTS AND RESPONSES 
This part attempts to address some possible arguments against the main conclusions reached 
in parts III, IV and V above. In part III, the conclusion was reached that Ethiopia’s first filling of 
the GERD violated the equitable and reasonable utilization principle of international water law. In 
part IV, the conclusion was reached that Ethiopia committed an internationally wrongful act during 
the first filling of the GERD. And in part V, the conclusion was reached that Egypt and Sudan 
would be entitled to full reparations from Ethiopia. Below, some possible arguments against these 
conclusions are set out, followed by the response.  
Argument 1: This paper seems to indicate that there was no way Ethiopia could have 
conducted the first filling of the GERD without violating the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle. The evolution of international water law shows, every riparian state has at least some 
rights on the waters of an international river. Therefore, just like the lower riparian states Sudan 
and Egypt, the upper riparian state Ethiopia has the right to equitably and reasonably utilize the 
waters of the Blue Nile river.   
Response: There was no way Ethiopia could have conducted the first filling of the GERD 
without violating the equitable and reasonable utilization principle. The definition of equitable and 
reasonable utilization set out in principle IV(e) of the GERD Agreement requires Ethiopia to take 
into account existing uses of the waters of the Blue Nile river.498 The facts indicate that Ethiopia 
did not take into account the existing uses of the waters when it conducted the first filling of the 
GERD between July 15 and 22, 2020. This outcome sounds inequitable. However, Ethiopia 
willingly agreed to do this seemingly inequitable thing. Ethiopia has the right to equitably and 
reasonably utilize the waters of the Blue Nile river, except that to equitably and reasonably utilize 
 




the waters means Ethiopia taking into account the existing uses. The existing uses allow Egypt and 
Sudan a 100% of the waters flowing from Ethiopia. Why Ethiopia agreed to this seemingly 
inequitable arrangement is beyond comprehension. The existing use arrangement clearly 
disadvantages Ethiopia, and yet, Ethiopia agreed to take it into account. Incomprehensible though 
it may be, this was not the first time Ethiopia signed an agreement disadvantageous to itself. The 
1902 UK-Ethiopia Treaty is the best example of Ethiopia entering into an agreement which is 
detrimental to its own interests. As discussed already, in article III of the 1902 agreement, the 
Ethiopian Emperor Menelek agreed with Britain not to build a dam in his own country without 
British permission.499 As shown above in part II, Sudan and Egypt did not succeed Britain to this 
treaty. This thesis focused on the legal issues involved regarding a specific event, namely the first 
filling of the GERD between July 15 and 22, 2020. A thoroughgoing analysis of the political forces 
that led to Ethiopia signing the 1902 agreement with Britain and the 2015 GERD Agreement with 
Egypt and Sudan is outside the scope of this thesis. Needless to say, whatever the political needs 
of the moment, international agreements are supposed to be thoroughly read and their implication 
clearly understood before they are signed. The facts indicate, Ethiopia conducted the first filling 
of the GERD during the rainy season and had made its plans public well in advance. Even so, 
Ethiopia cannot touch the Nile waters without violating the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle. This is because the principle requires Ethiopia to take into account existing uses which 
give 100% of the waters to Egypt and Sudan. 
Argument 2: Taking into account existing uses does not prevent Ethiopia from withdrawing 
water from the Blue Nile river. 
 




Response: The ICJ’s Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision shows that a state cannot assume 
unilateral control of a shared resource without violating the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle.500 Moreover, according to the Court’s decision in Pulp Mills, a riparian state’s utilization 
of a shared resource could not be considered to be equitable and reasonable if the interests of other 
riparian states in the shared resource were not taken into account.501 At the time of writing, it is 
not clear whether Ethiopia assumed unilateral control of the Blue Nile river during the first filling 
of the GERD. However, Ethiopia failed to take into account the existing uses of the river which 
give all the waters of the Blue Nile to Egypt and Sudan. Therefore, Ethiopia’s reduction of the 
water flow by any amount violates the equitable and reasonable utilization principle. 
Argument 3: The existing uses of the waters of the Blue Nile river established by the 1959 
agreement allocates all the waters of the Blue Nile river to Egypt and Sudan. This itself violates 
the equitable and reasonable utilization principle of international water law. Therefore, Ethiopia 
cannot be bound by the existing use arrangement.  
Response: It is true, the 1959 agreement violates the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle. But also true is the fact that Ethiopia agreed to take this very inequitable arrangement 
into account when utilizing the waters of the Blue Nile river. Ethiopia could renegotiate the 2015 
GERD Agreement; it has not done so. As long as the 2015 agreement stands, Ethiopia cannot touch 
the waters of the Blue Nile river without violating the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle. 
Argument 4: Ethiopia contributes all of the waters of the Blue Nile river. Egypt and Sudan 
contribute absolutely nothing. In the 1959 agreement, Egypt and Sudan divided the waters among 
themselves without so much as consulting Ethiopia. This sort of unilateralism on the part of the 
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lower riparian states justifies Ethiopia’s unilateralism on the GERD issue. The American example 
of the Harmon doctrine and also the Mekong and Indus river basin examples show that upper 
riparian states always act according to their interests. If anything, Ethiopia’s withdrawal of 4.9 
BCM out of a yearly discharge of 84 BCM was very gentle compared to what China and India 
were doing in the Mekong and Indus basins, respectively. So, Ethiopia was justified in impounding 
the water it needed for the first filling of its hydroelectric dam. If anything, it would be justified to 
impound as much water as it needs to fill the dam in the future. 
Response: Gently or otherwise, Ethiopia violated an agreement it has made with the lower 
riparian countries. China never made such as agreement in the Mekong Basin. And India made an 
agreement which, according to the Court of Arbitration and also Pakistan, it has not violated. An 
argument that Ethiopia can take as much water as it wants to fill the GERD is a political and not a 
legal one. The conclusions reached in this thesis are on the legal and not the political issues. As 
for justification, there is no such thing under the rubric of international water law. Customary 
international water law502 as well as the GERD Agreement503 rely on the equitable and reasonable 
utilization principle as water allocation strategy. Moreover, an internationally wrongful act is never 
justified. If the act of a state meets all the elements set out in article 2 of ARSIWA504, such act is 
an internationally wrongful act which entails the international responsibility of that state505. 
Ethiopia argues its conduct is justified for the simple reason that it is the sole contributor of the 
waters of the Blue Nile river. The problem with this argument is that it presupposes an alternate 
reality in which Ethiopia does not have the obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
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object and purpose of the 2015 GERD Agreement.506 But in the real world, Ethiopia has that 
obligation.  
Argument 5: Population is increasing in the entire Blue Nile basin region. It is very likely, 
sooner or later, Ethiopia will want to use the Blue Nile waters for irrigation and consumption, and 
rightly so. 
Response: The 2015 GERD Agreement is specifically designed to govern issues around this 
one dam. However, in the event the Blue Nile basin countries do not enter into further agreement, 
customary international water law would govern issues beyond the dam; that is, the equitable and 
reasonable utilization and the no significant harm principles would govern any issue related to 
irrigation and consumption.  
Argument 6: Sudan and Egypt have not shown injury due to Ethiopia’s first filling of the 
GERD. Therefore, they should not be entitled to any remedy. 
Response: At the time of writing, Sudan and Egypt have not shown the injury to them due 
to Ethiopia’s first filling of the GERD. However, this argument supposes injury to mean only 
actual harm. Under ARSIWA, an internationally wrongful act, regardless of actual harm, causes 
an injury and such injury is made right by full reparation in the form of restitution, compensation 
or satisfaction.507 The injured states decide what form reparation should take.508 Compensation 
seems the most practical alternative in the present case. However, it is up to Sudan and Egypt to 
decide what they want for reparations. At the present time, the two countries have condemned 
Ethiopia’s actions but have not yet claimed they were injured.509 Whenever they do, they have the 
option of deciding the form of reparation they would like.  
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Argument 7: If Egypt and Sudan are entitled to full reparations from Ethiopia for its 
internationally wrongful act, and the ICJ does not have jurisdiction over the matter, how can they 
obtain relief? 
Response: At least two things can happen that would give ICJ jurisdiction over the present 
issue: Egypt and Sudan can join or accede to the 2010 Nile Basin Agreement or Ethiopia can accept 
the ICJ’s jurisdiction as compulsory. If Egypt and Sudan decide to join the 2010 Nile Basin 
Agreement, article 34(1)(a) of the agreement would allow the two states to submit their dispute 
with Ethiopia to the ICJ.510 Based on article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute, the Court would have 
jurisdiction over the issue. Besides extending ICJ jurisdiction to disputes between the Nile Basin 
States, the 2010 Nile Basin Agreement offers practically the same protections as the 2015 GERD 
Agreement. Both agreements rely on the equitable and reasonable utilization principle.511 The 
other thing that can happen that would give ICJ jurisdiction over the present dispute is Ethiopia 
accepting the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory. If Ethiopia accepts the ICJ’s jurisdiction as 
compulsory, Egypt and Sudan would be able to bring the dispute to the Court. If Ethiopia does not 
accept the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory, and Egypt and Sudan do not join the 2010 Nile 
Basin Agreement, their only resort is principle X of the GERD Agreement, which would direct the 
parties to seek a political solution by referring the dispute to the Heads of the three governments.512 
CONCLUSION 
Ethiopia’s first filling of the GERD violated the equitable and reasonable utilization 
principle because Ethiopia failed to take into account the existing uses of the waters of the Blue 
Nile river as it had agreed to do in the GERD Agreement. Ethiopia’s violation of the equitable and 
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reasonable utilization principle is also an internationally wrongful act for which it would owe 
Egypt and Sudan full reparations. However, Egypt and Sudan cannot obtain relief from the ICJ 
because the Court does not have jurisdiction over the dispute. Ultimately, the dispute may have to 
be resolved at the political level.  
No nation, sovereign though it may be, can utilize water without some deference to the 
countries with which it shares the life-sustaining resource.513 Any attempt to confine or subject to 
exclusive control the waters of an international river is futile.514 However, this seems to be a 
concept lost on the Blue Nile basin states. It looks as if each of them thinks the principle applies 
only to the other states and not to itself. The international legal principle of jus cogens holds good 
neighborliness as paramount for harmonious international relations.515 It is hardly being good 
neighbors when one state, regardless of its position as an upper or lower riparian state, denies 
another the right to utilize a common resource. 
The Nile basin is known as a potential flashpoint for conflict on account of “the prevalence 
of inequitable water utilization and acrimonious inter-riparian relations.”516 That is why an ideal 
solution to the Nile issue will be hard to find: Egypt refuses to abandon its colonial-era claim while 
upstream states are rapidly developing requirements to use the same water.517 Ethiopia claims an 
equitable and reasonable right to build the GERD, while Egypt maintains its right to be free from 
significant harm that it claims would be caused to it by the dam.518 Stuck in the middle is Sudan. 
Claim of ownership by any state over the entire flow of the Nile would inevitably crumble if and 
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when major projects like the GERD become reality.519 There is no alternative to cooperation to 
achieve fair and equitable utilization.520 The back-and-forth between Egypt and Ethiopia, with 
Sudan in between them, has gone on for centuries.521 There is no telling if they will sort out their 
issues even before the end of times, but the hope is, at some point they might learn to “set aside 
their egoistic national interests”522. 
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